From Grace to Grass: How Laurent Lost His Laurel

Is it possible for someone to reach the periphery of glory only to sink into the abyss of scorn? If your answer is no, consider the almost very rosy but sorry story of President Laurent Koudou Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire who got as close as becoming another shining example of leadership in Africa, only to fall out of grace, due to his impertinence and unwillingness to cede power to the democratically-elected president of Cote d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara.

Rising without any prior political structure, it was Laurent Gbagbo’s ideas and activism that endeared him to millions of Ivoirians. He stood in opposition to the regime of Ivoirian’s most beloved leader, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, and unsuccessfully contested election against Houphouët-Boigny himself. He won the confidence of the people and went ahead to win the presidential seat. Insecurity and fears of violence would not allow for the conduct of elections several times, Laurent Gbagbo who first became president in 2000 and whose term should have ended in 2005 was given the go-ahead to preside over the nation for another 5 years, until 2010 when elections were eventually held.

Laurent Gbagbo was carried away by the trappings of power that he did not step down when it became clear that he had lost the election. He has now led Cote d’Ivoire back into the civil war; old wounds have been reopened; enemies have been made; economy has been damaged; millions have been displaced; lives have been lost. Unfortunately for Gbagbo, he is one professor of history who failed to learn from history.

Biography

Born in the village of Mama, near Gagnoa in 1945, Gbagbo studied in Cote d’Ivoire and France, obtaining his doctorate at Paris Diderot University in 1979. He became a history professor and an opponent of the regime of President Félix Houphouet-Boigny. He was imprisoned from March 31, 1971 to January 1973.

In 1980, he became director of the Institute of History, Art, and African Archeology at the University of Abidjan. He participated in a 1982 teachers' strike as a member of the National Trade Union of Research and Higher Education, and at this time he formed what would become the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). He went into exile in France in 1982, only to return to Côte d'Ivoire on September 13, 1988 and at the FPI's constitutive congress, held on November 19–20, 1988, he was elected as the party's Secretary-General.

Politics

Laurent Gbagbo was elected into the National Assembly of Cote d’Ivoire at different times. He contested the presidency, against Robert Guie, the sitting president who had disqualified Henry Konan Bedie and Alassane Ouattara in October 2000. Guie claimed victory but it took street protests by Gbagbo supporters to install him as president. Guie fled, Gbagbo led.

A coup attempt in 2002 soon led into a civil war, and the mutineers, mostly soldiers of the northern extraction soon became the rebels, morphing many times to become the New Forces. Truce was signed, there was relative peace, but arms were still held. As a result of this, Gbagbo could still hold power for another five years. This was power not won, but bestowed on him by mediators – AU, UN, the French government – and approved by his countrymen.

But when the elections were contested and lost, Gbagbo failed to appreciate the benevolence of the Ivoirian people to allow him to led them at all. He stood adamant, directing his forces and militia to win the victory for him on the street just like they did against Robert Guie. This time, it was misplaced. He had won the 2000 election (by 59.4 percent), and so he had a claim to the throne. This time around, he had lost and has no claim to the throne.

History repeats itself

Many are the voices that support Gbagbo’s decision to stay put. We have seen the effects of his staying adamant to claim a crown he does not deserve. But the question we should be asking is this: What is possible if he had handed over power willingly to Alassane Ouattara?

The 2010 election cycle was not much different from the 2000 elections which Gbagbo won. The sitting president then Robert Guie was reluctant to leave power. Laurent Gbagbo had to call his million supporters into the street to force Guie to recognize him as president. One departure point however was that Guie did not impose a blockade on Gbagbo, as Gbagbo had done on Ouattara.

If he took over from Robert Guie this way, why can’t Ouattara take over from him in a similar way?

Had he ceded power…

We could only theorize on what the situation would have been if Gbagbo had not chosen the path he chose. The following were possible if Gbagbo had ceded power to Ouattara:

• The animosities arising from the 2002-2004 civil war would have ended totally. One of the grouses of the northern rebels was that they were marginalized. A northerner (Ouattara) becoming a president would have healed those wounds.

• There would not have been a return to arms. Security would have been maintained.

• Many lives would not have been lost, nor would many people be displaced.

• The economy would have been saved. 

• There would not have been reasons for ‘interventionist forces’ – French army and the UNOCI – to shell their arms on the Ivoirian soil.

• Gbagbo would have been acclaimed as a great leader, who had the interest of Cote d’Ivoire at heart. Successors, however much they disagree with their predecessors, always have initial words of praise for them.

• Gbagbo would not be holed up in his residence now. He would still have been cheered in the streets.

• He would not be negotiating asylum/exile in another country/OR CAPTURED LIKE A RAT.

• He would not be afraid of being murdered.

• He would still have had the chance to contest the polls again.

• Maybe he would by now be a potential recipient of the Mo Ibrahim African Leadership Award.

However, Gbagbo did not step down while he had the chance; so, all the above are no longer possible. He has now been captured, and has against his will surrendered to Alassane Ouattara. Rather than enjoy a status as an elder statesman, Gbagbo will now face a court for his crimes. His credibility as a leader who seeks the broader interest of his nation and its people has been dented. He can no longer be praised for his great services for the Ivoirian nation.

And so, Laurent Gbagbo has lost his laurels.

The Responsibility to Protect and State Sovereignty: The Case Against Libya

"People in front of tanks were crushed. The unity of China was more important than those people on Tiananmen Square. When Tiananmen Square happened, tanks were sent in to deal with them. It's not a joke. I will do whatever it takes to make sure part of the country isn't taken away." – Muammar Gaddafi

Events in Libya have raised more than one question of the validity of foreign interference – in the name of global diplomacy – in issues deemed to be internal affairs of Libya. It is not only in Libya that these important questions have raised their heads, but in all countries where there seems to be conflict of one sort or the other, especially where it is government versus a group of people. It would be good to quickly point out that The Gambia’s aversion to the ECOWAS/AU/UN stance on the election standoff in Cote d’Ivoire is because of what it termed ‘undue interference in the internal affairs of Cote d’Ivoire’ and consequently an affront to the sovereignty of Cote d’Ivoire.

There could be arguments for and against global intervention in ‘internal conflicts’. This piece endeavours to ‘defend’ the actions taken by the international community on Libya.

The United Nations is the world’s foremost global diplomacy body. Coming out of the beleaguered League of Nations in 1945, the goal of the UN is to ensure a world safe enough for everybody to live in. The League of Nations before it had failed because it could not prevent the Second World War, therefore the first objective of the UN is to ensure global peace. This would imply that the UN is imbued with the authority to prevent wars and conflicts, or where there are, fast-track the process of peace. Thus, it does not matter whether these conflicts are inter- or intra-states. The mere presence of conflict is enough reason for the UN to wave its flag. In what manner it should wave it is the question.

Many nations of the world have signed to become recognized by the UN, and many have ratified its treaties, conventions, articles and Charter. By appending their recognition to these documents and treaties, countries express their agreement of the UN principles. There are two interpretation of this recognition: member states (1) approve the spirit and context of the document which they sign; and (2) they signify their intention to be bound by the provisions and conditions set out in the document. By so doing, they cede some of their rights to the United Nations. In situations where the countries run afoul of these UN principles, the UN does have a right to weigh in to enforce its rule. Thus, it could invoke its ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RToP) doctrine.

There are legitimate questions about when it could invoke this rule in crises situations. Freedom-Kai Phillips, a policy analyst and a representative to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) asked these important questions: “At what point in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe does a sovereign State lose its right to manage its own internal affairs without outside interference? What threshold must be reached before the international community has the legal right to intervene when massive human rights violations are being committed in a country?”

‘The responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) doctrine has longstanding roots in customary law, but was first formally introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and subsequently clarified in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome document. RtoP is an ever-evolving and innovative international legal concept aimed at preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

When does it become clear for instance that the Gaddafi government could no longer resort to peaceful measures to deal with the rebel movement? When the protests broke out, Gaddafi had promised that the rebel movement would be defeated. Nobody had problems with that. But he soon went to call the protesters all sorts of names and made a new stronger vow to root out the protesters, and kill them to the last man. This probably was the point that the international community started to listen and watch events in Libya more. Images soon emerge when unarmed protesters were fired at. [I have seen these videos of which I write.]

Maybe one of Gaddafi’s greatest undoing was his choice of words. I find this shocking: "People in front of tanks were crushed. The unity of China was more important than those people on Tiananmen Square. When Tiananmen Square happened, tanks were sent in to deal with them. It's not a joke. I will do whatever it takes to make sure part of the country isn't taken away."

At this point, it became clear that rather than follow the path of other countries in the Middle East who have immediately committed themselves to reforms, Gaddafi wanted to maintain the status quo. As infamous as the massacre of Chinese students were in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Gaddafi found these words to express what he would do.

This and many other statements, and acts of aggression emboldened the resolve of the United Nations to act. For the UN, the time was absolutely ripe to invoke the RToP doctrine.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon submitted a report outlining a three-pillared approach to implementing RtoP. First, sovereignty must be viewed in light of responsibility, in that States have a reciprocal obligation to protect their citizens. Second, the international community must be prepared to provide development assistance and capacity building for States, as RtoP cannot be conceptualised in a geo-political vacuum, but rather as a culmination of socio-political circumstances which must be holistically and sustainably addressed. Finally, in the face of a manifest failure by a State to protect its citizens, the international community must be prepared to provide a timely and decisive response.

In the case of Libya, it seems clear that the State had failed to protect its citizens; it had declared war on them, and thus it was important that the global world respond.

There have been precedents that necessitate this needed action. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 shows the failure of the international to act fast against an humanitarian crisis. Events in Libya clearly pointed out another crisis that could lead to genocide. The world needs not to wait for this.

Selective Intervention?

One could argue that the international community has been selective in its enforcement of the RToP. Why have governments’ repressions against protesters in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain being overlooked for instance? According to the United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, each case has its own merits and should be taken as a stand-alone.

It is true that extensive Western interests in these countries would make hard-standing difficult. But then, governments in these countries have changed hands. The Bahraini leader, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa inherited the position from his father in 1999, while the Saudi Arabia King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz came on the throne in 2005. True it is that these are monarchies, but true it is also that powers have changed hands. This is not the same with Libya, where Gaddafi has directed affairs since 1969. Libya thus presents its own unique case. Reports of human rights abuses in the past, repression of the freedom of expression and many others further present Libya as a unique case.

Despite the escalation of conflicts, one could only hope that the Gaddafi regime bows to the aspirations of the people: to cede power. With that, the unity of the country would still be preserved and more bloodshed could be averted.

Ode to an Emperor

Having led a privileged life as Brother Leader and guide of the Libyan ‘Revolution’ for 41 years now, Col. Muammar Gaddafi is an alien to living as an ordinary man again, and that is why he finds calls that he should step down as Libya’s leader as an anathema. Even though what was supposed to be Libya’s version of the Jasmine Revolution has now morphed into a civil war which is increasingly claiming lives, destroying properties and crippling the future, Gaddafi has shown no signs of stepping down and has even vowed to fight till the last breath.

Events in recent days show the Emperor regaining control of Libya, confident once again that he might win this war. As his son, Saif al-Islam puts it: “Everything will be over in 48 hours.”

Since the beginning of the Libyan revolution, some people, I included, have been making extra efforts to understand how the Gaddafi mind works, his philosophy of governance issues of state security and negotiating peace. For this special task, I have made extra efforts, often at personal discomfort to finish reading Gaddafi’s treatise on governance, The Green Book. The first time I endeavored to read the book was in 1999, but it took a revolution in the desert country a decade and two years after for me to finish it up.

Gaddafi was clear enough in his philosophy: Democracy is sham and it robs people of their powers.

He was baffled how one person for instance could represent a constituency of thousands. That is injustice. For him, pluralistic governance composed of people’s congresses and committees is the key to the prosperity of the nation. He described his system as Islamic/Arab socialism, where people themselves should be the executor of power.

My understanding of this is that it is Gaddafi who had betrayed his treatise, by instituting an inner circle of committee loyal to him alone and not to the country, to be the executor of people’s will. By neutralising an atmosphere by which people could line up behind another leader, Gaddafi has instituted a monolithic structure that pays tribute to himself alone, effectively neutering opposition.

Maybe Gaddafi needs a lesson from his own book. The Libyan revolution, the one that is happening now, is just what Gaddafi had idealized. According to him, the people should have a direct say in the affairs of the government, not through layers and layers of committees and congresses that mean only one thing: Gaddafi.

The people have formed their own committees, not committees formed on their behalf and are now demanding their own agenda. They were demanding that Gaddafi has had enough shot at the No. 1 spot. It was an agenda drawn up by the people themselves, not by external actors, as Gaddafi wants us believe. If this revolution had been to fight, let’s say the Americans, I believe Gaddafi himself would edge the people on.

As Western diplomats have written (thanks to Wikileaks!), no one really understands the Gaddafi mind, or what the next script in his playbook could be. However, if we take some liberty to examine his past conducts and speeches, it portrays a person torn between the divisions in himself, thus, portraying to the world two-sidedness that could only point to larger inner contradictions.

In a fiery broadcast in the early days of this revolution, Gaddafi had said he has no position to stand down from, that he would fight till the last ounce of his breath. Gaddafi said the people fighting for their freedom are not revolutionaries; they are al-Qaeda frontmen who have been supplied with ammunition and are high on drugs.

Would the Emperor define for us what a revolution could have meant? Gaddafi had once sought to rewrite history by labelling his coup d’etat as a revolution. In all major revolutions of the world, an institution has grown out of the popular disaffection people have for previous rulers. They are aware of the misgivings of the previous regimes, and rather than entrench themselves, they build institutions. This is not the case in Libya, where everything has revolved around Gaddafi.

Gaddafi told us that he has no position to stand down from. Is that true? If he has no position in the Libyan hierarchy, why is he the face of that country at international fora? His argument could have been tenable if the General Secretary of the Libyan People’s Congress for instance had been the Libyan head of state who represent the country at the Africa Union level, or if he (GS) had been the one who addressed diplomats at the 2009 United Nations General Assembly. For all we know, Gaddafi was not representing anybody at these fora. He represented himself as the leader of Libya. That exactly is the position the protesters want him step down from.

Gaddafi is many persons to many people. Some have commended him for his call for a United States of Africa? I have commended him for his spirited effort at bringing Africa closer to a more effective union. But one has reasons to second-guess his motives. Was Gaddafi ever serious with this call, seeking sincerely the goodwill of Africa, or he was just looking for a grander platform to rub his ego.

It is instructive to note that when African countries were not moving towards union fast enough, Gaddafi ghost-organised a meeting of African kings who then go ahead to crown him as the King of Kings of Africa. He also declared himself as the Imam of Imams at an Arab League meeting, walking out of a meeting of Arabs heads of states, in antagonism to the Saudi King Abdullah.

Anybody who sincerely wants the unity of Africa and its prosperity would not call for its disintegration. Rather, he would seek ways by which unity could be made lucrative. However, Gaddafi failed this test, as he called for the split of Nigeria along religious lines when religious tensions heated up between Muslim and Christians in Jos. This pointed to another contradiction in the Libyan leader.

What could have been his motive to have betrayed his life-long dream of Africa unity. It is on record that Gaddafi’s personal commitment and push was instrumental in the transformation of the lame-duck Organization of African Unity into the Africa Union. However, his passion for incendiary remarks, what in Nigeria would be called diarrhoea of the mouth is rubbishing his great record of service.

Another contradiction in Moammar Gaddafi is quite recent. He wanted the world to believe that the revolutionaries are being edged on by al-Qaeda, but now that it seems the tide is flowing in his favour in the conflict, Gaddafi has threatened the West that he would liaise with al-Qaeda to fight the West. Something doesn’t ring right there. If al Qaeda has sponsored an insurgency against you, why would you it be the same al Qaeda that you work with again?

Though Gaddafi gradually looks as if he would survive the revolution, the Emperor’s authority has been challenged, and it is expected that for some time now, he would go back to his pariah status.

Issues from the conflict

It is marked that the West was reluctant to support the Libyan revolutionaries. Whatever the ‘real’ reasons, the fact that Tunisia and Egypt unplugged their long-term rulers without Western support could have encouraged the foot-dragging on whether to help the Libyans stop Gaddafi or not. But anybody would know that neither President Zine Abideen Ben Ali nor President Hosni Mubarak had the level of brutality to kill people wanting to free themselves of tyranny as Gaddafi had done. They should have known that Gaddafi could not have been an easy ruler to remove. An earlier action would have saved a lot of lives, and avoided this bust of activities we have seen in recent days.

If Gaddafi wins, which he may, the world should expect many more deaths. Gaddafi does not look if he would forgive the insurgents. We could just expect that large scale genocides might happen against his ‘enemies’.

Whatever the outcome which would become clearer in the coming days, the Emperor has shown us that there are more contradictions to him than we might thought before.