Thursday, January 6, 2011
Cote d'Ivoire: ECOWAS’ big diplomatic headache
The events in Cote d’Ivoire should be of worry to us. Laurent Gbagbo has refused to relinquish power to Alassane Outtara, who was declared duly elected president in the November 28, 2010 presidential elections by the country’s Electoral Commission. The result was certified by the UN Mission in the country which had the mandate to certify results in its umpire role. However, in a twist of events, the Constitutional Council, headed by a Gbagbo ally declared thousands of votes from the north, apparently a stronghold of Ouattara as invalid, thus securing a ‘win’ for Gbagbo. The calculation was not that simple, as this act of the Constitutional Council has taken the country back many miles. Now, the old wounds that caused the 2002 Civil War seem so fresh, and they are hurting. Claiming onto his mandate, Ouattara swore himself in and formed a cabinet. Gbagbo had done the same. One plus one is not always two. To a lay watcher, Gbagbo was basking on his power of incumbency, with both the state broadcaster and the military machine backing him. However, the funds of the government remain in the hands of the Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), and being an arm of the Economic Community of West African States which recognized Ouattara, it declined Gbagbo access to the funds he would need to function effectively as president. This may seem like some soap opera, but it is not. The situation in Cote d’Ivoire is a time bomb. First, it discredits the political process in Africa. Despite some mild gains in democratic governance, the recent wave of sit-tightism which has brought in its wake the concept of power sharing is doing harm more than good. What Gbagbo fails to realize is that he would have been a far more honourable man leaving the reins of power. He could start the campaign that Ouattara is not Ivorian enough or that he is a puppet of foreign power, he could however not dispute the fact that the election was decided against him. There are many challenges that confront us in this case, and this piece intends to look at each of these and the possible consequences.
First, why would Gbagbo not leave?
A flashback into events that prelude the elections might help. More than once, Ouattara had been denied an opportunity to run for presidential elections. Being from the north, it was suspected that his parents are of Burkinabe origin, and that he was in fact born in Burkina Faso. (However, the ‘birthers’ have not provided a shred of evidence to support this.) His place of birth has been recorded as Dimbokro in central Cote d'Ivoire, but others put it at an unidentified place Burkina Faso. He had his primary and secondary education in Burkina Faso, but that does not make him a Burkinabe. How many Senegalese children are students in The Gambia? Does that make them Gambian? No. In 1995, it was decided that people who have not lived inside Cote d’Ivoire for at least five years and/or whose one of the parents is of foreign nationality is not Ivorian enough, and so could not contest presidency. Having worked for the most part of his life outside Cote d’Ivoire, Ouattara was disqualified. The same thing happened in 2000. In an interview with L’Humanite magazine on August 26, 2007, President Gbagbo said Ouattara could not contest. Whereas when asked in an interview about Ouattara's nationality, Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré responded, "For us things are simple: he does not come from Burkina Faso, neither by birth, marriage, or naturalization. This man has been Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire." Gbagbo continued to follow through his Ivoirite (Ivorianess) policy. Many people in the north claimed that they were denied of their nationality as Ivoirians. They could not get Ivoirian identity cards. In 2002, some northern soldiers mutinied, thus leading the country effectively into civil war. The election was thus necessary to wound old scars. Under this arrangement, there was no another choice but to allow Ouattara to contest. At this point, Gbagbo started to campaign under the slogan "we win or we win". It was evident that he was not prepared for an exit. Assuming office in 2000, Gbagbo's original mandate as president expired on October 30, 2005, but due to the lack of disarmament following the Civil War, it was deemed impossible to hold an election, and therefore his term in office has been extended since.
Could Ouattara have won?
The north of Ivory Coast sees itself as marginalized. The repeated attempts to block Ouattara from contesting the polls have only helped to solidify his northern stronghold, where many people now believe that a Ouattara win is a win for them all, and a redress of history. This would be seen in a massive turnout of voters during the voter registration process and the elections. It is nearly impossible for Gbagbo to have won votes from the north, but Ouattara could still have won votes from the south, which is Gbagbo’s stronghold. It is reflective to note that Ouattara had struck a deal with Henri Konan Bedie, another presidential aspirant, to support him as the frontrunner for the opposition in the second round. The excuse that rebels rigged in favour of Ouattara could then be lame on delivery. The vote was largely a statement from the collective north that it was time one of their own rules. Ouattara win could also signify the yearning of pro-Houphouet-Boigny democrats, which now formed the bulk of opposition, to return to power. What does the situation portend for Ivory Coast and what are ways of working this diplomatic jigsaw? The United Nations, African Union, European Union and ECOWAS have all recognized Ouattara as the duly elected president. This has narrowed choices for Gbagbo who now faces a number of sanctions, mostly economic sanctions and travel bans. The BCEAO has also refused him access to Ivorian funds. There are already proposals for dialogue and mediation in the matter. There is a proposed ECOWAS military intervention, and there is a more consuming economic sanction.
Dialogue and Mediation The path which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union are presently toeing is the dialogue/mediation process. As the chairman of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan said, the regional bloc would do anything legitimate to restore democratic principles in Cote d’Ivoire. Include in this bracket the use of force if that is the only way Gbagbo could be removed. But before that, all soft measures would be sought. Already, three ECOWAS leaders (Yayi Boni of Benin, Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and Pedro Pires of Cape Verde) have met with both Gbagbo and Ouattara. While Gbagbo has signified an intention to seek a ‘peaceful’ end to the crisis, he has shown no signs of relinquishing power. By even mooting a possible recount of the votes, it is said that Gbagbo is posturing himself for a power-sharing deal in the manner of Kenya and Zimbabwe, though he was not categorical about this. The problem with such power sharing deals is that it does not resolve the problem; it only postponed it. Experiences in both Kenya and Zimbabwe have shown that rather than heal the wounds, both the president and the newly created premiership are strange bedfellows. Their cohabitation in the power deal does not obliterate the existing animosity nor does it help the country move forward. By agreeing to a peace talk without pre-conditions, Gbagbo seem to call Ouattara to let go of his claim to presidency. The only solution that dialogue/mediation can bring is to give the mandate back to the rightful owner. Anything short of that is just a postponement of woes.
ECOWAS military intervention
ECOWAS has not ruled out a military intervention to oust Gbagbo. But this is fraught with more problems than could be imagined at first. This would be the first time that ECOWAS would be using force to settle a political quagmire within a country. But then, not all West African countries subscribe to this interventionist force. The Gambia, for its part, has shown its disavowal of any military plans to oust Gbagbo. While The Gambian government discredits this option, asking ECOWAS why it had not intervened in similar crises in Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau, and why its intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia came after thousands of lives have been lost, it is important to point out that there is always a first time. This might be that first time. But what are the permutations for an ECOWAS force at this time? Nigeria, which is by far the biggest of the ECOWAS states, and the seemingly most advanced in military operations, could not at this time commit troops to a cause that is remote, while there are bomb explosions rocking the country by the day. The security challenges of other ECOWAS countries are enough to stop them from committing troops to such an operation. [Senegal is fighting an insurgency in Casamance; both Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry are just stabilizing]. As one commentator pointed out, the years 2011 and 2012 are political years for many ECOWAS countries, and ‘bringing back body bags does not help campaigns’. So, if ECOWAS would truly deploy a force, that would take some time when the security and political challenges before these countries could have subsided. Maybe Gbagbo would have served out the term by then. Another consideration here is that the Ivorian army stands solidly behind Gbagbo for now. This is a well-trained and tested army that could resist aggression. In other words, there would be many casualties, more than is necessary to oust a single person. As a matter of fact, the ECOWAS military intervention is more of an empty threat than a meant line of action. Yet Alassane Ouattara and his comrades still believe that ECOWAS could still send in a troop. Guillamme Soro, Ouattara’s prime minister has said that the only power that could force Gbagbo out is a military intervention. Ouattara himself said: "All that needs to be done, as has been done in other African countries, is to come and get Gbagbo and remove him from the presidential palace." This is easier for Ouattara to say because he has never been in the military. No commandant ever wants his troops dead. And they cannot just ‘remove him from the presidential palace’ when he still has a corps of loyal officers.
Exile or Amnesty
In his first interview with the press since he was holed up in the Hotel du Golf, Alassane Ouattara has said that Gbagbo would have his full rights as a citizen if he relinquishes power. That is amnesty. However, if he chose to leave the country, Nigeria and the United States have indicated interest to welcome him and make him feel at home as much as he wants. There is no indication Gbagbo would settle for this option, unless economic sanctions incapacitated him from paying salaries and carrying out the functions of his office effectively.
Could there be a relapse into the civil war?
Not necessarily. Presidential claimant, Alassane Ouattara played down any possibility of the country returning to its 2002-2003 civil war hostilities. According to him, a neatly done removal [by ECOWAS forces] need not ignite violence. According to the BBC, even during the civil war, there were never large-scale hostilities, rather the odd skirmish and riots in cities such as Abidjan, the commercial capital and a stronghold of Mr Gbagbo, which saw attacks on foreigners, Muslims and northerners. Ouattara has however accused Gbagbo of buying time to recruit mercenaries to kill the Ivorian people. It was documented that during the civil war, Liberian mercenaries helped Mr. Gbagbo’s troops, and are still helping him. This time around, Liberia is ready to denounce any Liberian who fight for any of the parties in Cote d’Ivoire. But as the seat of power is in the south, the northern rebels would not want to be shut away again. They would rather not fight.
Conclusion
The situation so far presents questions, and rarely offers answers. How would ECOWAS resolve this crisis, if at the end of dialogue and mediation, Gbagbo refuses to step down, and Ouattara does not rescind his claim to the presidency? Would BCEAO offer Gbagbo access to the country’s funds again, as many innocent civil servants especially would be affected? Or would the military who support Gbagbo now enter the fray, declare themselves winners of this deadlock? It is yet to be seen how the crisis could be contained. However, if ECOWAS could provide an effective solution to this, then bravo to democracy in the subcontinent.
First, why would Gbagbo not leave?
A flashback into events that prelude the elections might help. More than once, Ouattara had been denied an opportunity to run for presidential elections. Being from the north, it was suspected that his parents are of Burkinabe origin, and that he was in fact born in Burkina Faso. (However, the ‘birthers’ have not provided a shred of evidence to support this.) His place of birth has been recorded as Dimbokro in central Cote d'Ivoire, but others put it at an unidentified place Burkina Faso. He had his primary and secondary education in Burkina Faso, but that does not make him a Burkinabe. How many Senegalese children are students in The Gambia? Does that make them Gambian? No. In 1995, it was decided that people who have not lived inside Cote d’Ivoire for at least five years and/or whose one of the parents is of foreign nationality is not Ivorian enough, and so could not contest presidency. Having worked for the most part of his life outside Cote d’Ivoire, Ouattara was disqualified. The same thing happened in 2000. In an interview with L’Humanite magazine on August 26, 2007, President Gbagbo said Ouattara could not contest. Whereas when asked in an interview about Ouattara's nationality, Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré responded, "For us things are simple: he does not come from Burkina Faso, neither by birth, marriage, or naturalization. This man has been Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire." Gbagbo continued to follow through his Ivoirite (Ivorianess) policy. Many people in the north claimed that they were denied of their nationality as Ivoirians. They could not get Ivoirian identity cards. In 2002, some northern soldiers mutinied, thus leading the country effectively into civil war. The election was thus necessary to wound old scars. Under this arrangement, there was no another choice but to allow Ouattara to contest. At this point, Gbagbo started to campaign under the slogan "we win or we win". It was evident that he was not prepared for an exit. Assuming office in 2000, Gbagbo's original mandate as president expired on October 30, 2005, but due to the lack of disarmament following the Civil War, it was deemed impossible to hold an election, and therefore his term in office has been extended since.
Could Ouattara have won?
The north of Ivory Coast sees itself as marginalized. The repeated attempts to block Ouattara from contesting the polls have only helped to solidify his northern stronghold, where many people now believe that a Ouattara win is a win for them all, and a redress of history. This would be seen in a massive turnout of voters during the voter registration process and the elections. It is nearly impossible for Gbagbo to have won votes from the north, but Ouattara could still have won votes from the south, which is Gbagbo’s stronghold. It is reflective to note that Ouattara had struck a deal with Henri Konan Bedie, another presidential aspirant, to support him as the frontrunner for the opposition in the second round. The excuse that rebels rigged in favour of Ouattara could then be lame on delivery. The vote was largely a statement from the collective north that it was time one of their own rules. Ouattara win could also signify the yearning of pro-Houphouet-Boigny democrats, which now formed the bulk of opposition, to return to power. What does the situation portend for Ivory Coast and what are ways of working this diplomatic jigsaw? The United Nations, African Union, European Union and ECOWAS have all recognized Ouattara as the duly elected president. This has narrowed choices for Gbagbo who now faces a number of sanctions, mostly economic sanctions and travel bans. The BCEAO has also refused him access to Ivorian funds. There are already proposals for dialogue and mediation in the matter. There is a proposed ECOWAS military intervention, and there is a more consuming economic sanction.
Dialogue and Mediation The path which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union are presently toeing is the dialogue/mediation process. As the chairman of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan said, the regional bloc would do anything legitimate to restore democratic principles in Cote d’Ivoire. Include in this bracket the use of force if that is the only way Gbagbo could be removed. But before that, all soft measures would be sought. Already, three ECOWAS leaders (Yayi Boni of Benin, Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and Pedro Pires of Cape Verde) have met with both Gbagbo and Ouattara. While Gbagbo has signified an intention to seek a ‘peaceful’ end to the crisis, he has shown no signs of relinquishing power. By even mooting a possible recount of the votes, it is said that Gbagbo is posturing himself for a power-sharing deal in the manner of Kenya and Zimbabwe, though he was not categorical about this. The problem with such power sharing deals is that it does not resolve the problem; it only postponed it. Experiences in both Kenya and Zimbabwe have shown that rather than heal the wounds, both the president and the newly created premiership are strange bedfellows. Their cohabitation in the power deal does not obliterate the existing animosity nor does it help the country move forward. By agreeing to a peace talk without pre-conditions, Gbagbo seem to call Ouattara to let go of his claim to presidency. The only solution that dialogue/mediation can bring is to give the mandate back to the rightful owner. Anything short of that is just a postponement of woes.
ECOWAS military intervention
ECOWAS has not ruled out a military intervention to oust Gbagbo. But this is fraught with more problems than could be imagined at first. This would be the first time that ECOWAS would be using force to settle a political quagmire within a country. But then, not all West African countries subscribe to this interventionist force. The Gambia, for its part, has shown its disavowal of any military plans to oust Gbagbo. While The Gambian government discredits this option, asking ECOWAS why it had not intervened in similar crises in Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau, and why its intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia came after thousands of lives have been lost, it is important to point out that there is always a first time. This might be that first time. But what are the permutations for an ECOWAS force at this time? Nigeria, which is by far the biggest of the ECOWAS states, and the seemingly most advanced in military operations, could not at this time commit troops to a cause that is remote, while there are bomb explosions rocking the country by the day. The security challenges of other ECOWAS countries are enough to stop them from committing troops to such an operation. [Senegal is fighting an insurgency in Casamance; both Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry are just stabilizing]. As one commentator pointed out, the years 2011 and 2012 are political years for many ECOWAS countries, and ‘bringing back body bags does not help campaigns’. So, if ECOWAS would truly deploy a force, that would take some time when the security and political challenges before these countries could have subsided. Maybe Gbagbo would have served out the term by then. Another consideration here is that the Ivorian army stands solidly behind Gbagbo for now. This is a well-trained and tested army that could resist aggression. In other words, there would be many casualties, more than is necessary to oust a single person. As a matter of fact, the ECOWAS military intervention is more of an empty threat than a meant line of action. Yet Alassane Ouattara and his comrades still believe that ECOWAS could still send in a troop. Guillamme Soro, Ouattara’s prime minister has said that the only power that could force Gbagbo out is a military intervention. Ouattara himself said: "All that needs to be done, as has been done in other African countries, is to come and get Gbagbo and remove him from the presidential palace." This is easier for Ouattara to say because he has never been in the military. No commandant ever wants his troops dead. And they cannot just ‘remove him from the presidential palace’ when he still has a corps of loyal officers.
Exile or Amnesty
In his first interview with the press since he was holed up in the Hotel du Golf, Alassane Ouattara has said that Gbagbo would have his full rights as a citizen if he relinquishes power. That is amnesty. However, if he chose to leave the country, Nigeria and the United States have indicated interest to welcome him and make him feel at home as much as he wants. There is no indication Gbagbo would settle for this option, unless economic sanctions incapacitated him from paying salaries and carrying out the functions of his office effectively.
Could there be a relapse into the civil war?
Not necessarily. Presidential claimant, Alassane Ouattara played down any possibility of the country returning to its 2002-2003 civil war hostilities. According to him, a neatly done removal [by ECOWAS forces] need not ignite violence. According to the BBC, even during the civil war, there were never large-scale hostilities, rather the odd skirmish and riots in cities such as Abidjan, the commercial capital and a stronghold of Mr Gbagbo, which saw attacks on foreigners, Muslims and northerners. Ouattara has however accused Gbagbo of buying time to recruit mercenaries to kill the Ivorian people. It was documented that during the civil war, Liberian mercenaries helped Mr. Gbagbo’s troops, and are still helping him. This time around, Liberia is ready to denounce any Liberian who fight for any of the parties in Cote d’Ivoire. But as the seat of power is in the south, the northern rebels would not want to be shut away again. They would rather not fight.
Conclusion
The situation so far presents questions, and rarely offers answers. How would ECOWAS resolve this crisis, if at the end of dialogue and mediation, Gbagbo refuses to step down, and Ouattara does not rescind his claim to the presidency? Would BCEAO offer Gbagbo access to the country’s funds again, as many innocent civil servants especially would be affected? Or would the military who support Gbagbo now enter the fray, declare themselves winners of this deadlock? It is yet to be seen how the crisis could be contained. However, if ECOWAS could provide an effective solution to this, then bravo to democracy in the subcontinent.
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Wole Soyinka: An activist writer @ 76
Last Tuesday marked the 76th year of existence of one of Africa’s most brilliant yet controversial minds, and in our bid to remember him, as one of Africa’s literary giants and Pan- Africanist, we explore who the man Wole Soyinka really is.
Soyinka is no doubt an African enigma. While it is difficult to put a definition to the man known for his bravery and outspokenness especially in the face of injustice and what he sees as the oppression of the just man, Soyinka has established himself over the years as a person who is also known to favour ‘two sides of the coin’, who wants people to know the story.
While it would be simplistic to say Soyinka is flatly an activist, it would be on the safer side to say, he is a writer, an idealist yet realist. This much of Soyinka could be glimpsed from his interactions with the forces of the society (his realism), and his desire for what is ideal as expounded in a number of his books.
Not to confuse him with Chinua Achebe, with whom he has often been compared, Soyinka is an optimist, who sees a measure of good in his characters, and constructs them to achieve a deeper purpose in life. The differences between him and Achebe would further be played out in real life situations: Soyinka believes in Nigeria and Africa; he believes that things could be put aright if certain measures are put in place. This, among many other reasons, was why he had chosen to live in Nigeria despite his being world-wise like Achebe. Achebe, however, seem to believe that everything is lost; and nothing could be done to redeem the black man.
Soyinka’s activism is pronounced. He had wanted to serve in the Second World War, even at age 10; but his height, which was way too below what was required, fouled him. He was one of the Original Seven who founded the Pyrate Confraternity, now the National Association of Seadogs, to oppose the Westernisation of African students at the then University College, Ibadan, and to defend the minority female students. He opposed the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, negotiating with Western powers not to support any of the warring factions. He was imprisoned for close to three years for this ‘treasonable felony’. While in prison, and denied access to a paper and pen, he invented the Soy-ink, and was scribbling away at edges of newspapers, and other scraps he could lay his hands on. All these were in his youth.
Even in his old age, Soyinka has never for once left his activism, or may be his activism never left him. Last year, he branded a BBC documentary on Lagos set in the slum areas of the once Nigerian capital as both condescending and colonialist. He had months earlier called Britain a ‘cesspit of religious extremism’ while responding to the case of the Christmas bomber, Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab.
The series of three programmes, titled ‘Welcome to Lagos’ follows groups of people living in three impoverished areas: a rubbish dump, a Lagos lagoon and the city’s beach area.
In an interview with The Guardian about the series, Professor Soyinka said that the BBC2 observational documentary was ‘the most tendentious and lopsided programme’ he had ever seen. Although the series was well received in UK by most critics, Soyinka is not at all at home with the message portrayed by the series. He said the programme displayed “the worst aspects of “colonialist and patronising” attitudes towards Africa.
“There was no sense of Lagos as what it is – a modern African state. What we had was jaundiced and extremely patronising. It was saying ‘Oh look at these people who can make a living from the pit of degradation’. He lambasted the BBC which has over the years built a close relationship with him.
Where did Soyinka get his activism, and his views of everyday human society?
A re-reading of his autobiographical books, Ake and Ibadan, which document his youth, upto the age of 10, and his growing up, attending the University, both in Nigeria and London, and his eventual emergence as a teacher of Drama and Literature, help reconstruct the septuagenarian’s activism. Most recently, his memoirs You Shall Set Forth At Dawn brings to fore his hindsight of events, and either a justification or rebuke of these.
Born in 1934 in Abeokuta, Western Nigeria, Soyinka tells us in Ake of being an emissary in the Women Riots of 1949, where his mother took an active leading role. That was the breeding grounds of Soyinka’s activism. A son of a teacher whom he refers to as Essay in his book Isara: A Journey Around My Father, (apparently, a factionalised biography of his father) Soyinka was always beside his disciplinarian father, listening to elderly comments on current realities, and possible solutions. Right from this young age, the stage was almost set for young Soyinka to evolve into an activist that we now celebrate.
In Ibadan, Soyinka recollects his experiences at the Government College Ibadan, a colonial school at the time; and how he stood up on many occasions to the teachers. He recounts instances where he daunted all odds and dug out a juju supposedly buried by a Bini boy. In all these, it was evident that Soyinka was not at all getting prepared for a passive adult life.
It may be said, without much contradiction, that Soyinka’s writing is a way of giving vent to his activism. He has participated in a number of road walks, campaigning against one form of injustice or the other; yet this could not really distinguish his voice from the million others that also agitate along with him; thus Soyinka takes the pen.
Soyinka is credited as one of the best users of the English language in the world. How does it happen? An answer is still present in his upbringing as a boy in a purely Yoruba culture, where the mastery of language is encouraged. The truth is that Soyinka mastered his own culture, and falls on it in writing. This is probably the answer why his play Death and the King’s Horseman though written in English could be translated into Yoruba almost word for word.
Soyinka is an organiser, and a thinker. While he taught drama and literature at various universities in Ibadan, Lagos, and Ife, where, since 1975, he has been professor of comparative literature, he founded the theatre group, "The 1960 Masks" and in 1964, the "Orisun Theatre Company", in which he has produced his own plays and taken part as actor. He was also known to have composed a lot of music most of which were performed by his theatre group. Notable among this was I Love My Country, composed in pidgin. Not to forget, he has also been touted as only second to the late Ken Saro-Wiwa in the use of pidgin.
Soyinka has also been known to be a very astute critic of the Nigerian government. He has also written and performed celebrated plays and satires of African colonialist attitudes and on African dictatorships. He has even spoken out against the regime of Zimbabwean leader Mugabe.
Amongst his birthday wishes, Soyinka has been called ‘one in one hundred and forty million’, and he has also been called the ‘untainted soul’. People world over, and Nigerians view Soyinka as a fruit without blemish who has inspired a lot of Africans world over to do the right thing and criticize their government when it seems to be heading the wrong way.
A case in point of Soyinka’s views is captured in his critically analysed work ‘The Interpreter’. ‘The Interpreter’, set in post colonial Nigeria, revolves round the lives of six friends, who have returned to the country with foreign degrees, and high hopes of snagging rewarding jobs. First things first however: they have to fit into the system. The book tells of each of their experiences in their quest to achieve their dreams. It also tells of the then corruption which has not still left Nigeria; ‘Sagoe, the somewhat cynical journalist, faces corruption as he discovers that his American degree is not all he needs to attain a good job. Following an interview with a newspaper over a possible position, a member of the paper's board demands for a bribe and explains, "... degree is too plenty... so everybody is rushing to fill all vacancy."
According to writer Amina Maikori, The Interpreters' as a cocktail of sorts, laced with humour, social realism and giving an insight into the neo-colonised system that used to and still pervades the Nigerian society.
Associated with the post-colonial movement in writing, Soyinka is one of the most prolific writers ever to emerge out of Africa, having published plays, poetry collections, novels, autobiographies, reviews, essays and critiques, speeches as well as children story books. No doubt that Africa’s first literary Nobel laureate deserves to be celebrated, not just as a fanfare on every July 13, but as an open-ended subject of Africa’s social realities and literature.
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