Thursday, April 28, 2011

Cracking the Libyan Jigsaw

Col. Muammar Gaddafi has been a difficult nut to crack. Despite efforts of the international forces to curtail his forces from using violence on the Libyan people, he has continued to defeat the revolutionaries. Even the latest shelling of his Bab al Aziziah compound is not enough to deter the Libyan strongman. Now in its 10th week, the protests against Gaddafi has still been unable to unseat him while though the noose has tightened around his neck, Gaddafi is showing no signs of leaving.

Events have taken many different turns and twists in the last 10 weeks, and while Gaddafi was morally battered for his forces’ response to the Arab-wide protests in his territory in the wake of the protests, current happenings and the interpretations we might adduce from them show that Gaddafi may now have a ‘moral’ edge over his adversaries, especially the international forces that have stepped up actions against his regime.
This article is not an attempt to support Col. Gaddafi. It however aims at balancing views in light of other similar historical events.

If it is true, as some claim, that the field of international relations and global diplomacy is a murky water, consistently inconsistent, then the Libya situation and the response it has elicited so far has proven it so. When the United Nations determined that civilians were no longer safe at the hands of the Gaddafi force, that the rights of ‘peaceful’ protesters to demonstrate their anger at their government was being impeded, that the freedom of speech was being restricted, it adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 

The resolution came on 17 March 2011, a full one month since the troubles erupted. The UNSCR 1973 is a broad policy direction aimed at pressuring Gaddafi to leave. It includes chiefly instituting a ‘no-fly’ zone, economic sanctions and travel restrictions on key Gaddafi henchmen, arms embargo and protecting civilian populations. Let us take each of these one after the other.

The UNSCR 1973 authorized member states who have expressed willingness to participate in the assault on Libya to do so, after getting the clearance such from the UN Secretary General. It also approved ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. The problem with the resolution was that it did not define what it means when it says ‘civilians’ or what measures it categorises as being ‘necessary’ to deter Gadaffi from his murderous stance. I concur that the meanings of these words might be self-evident at the start of the conflict, but they don’t seem to remain so any longer.

For instance, the first images that emerged of the Libyan protesters were of placard-carrying, mufti-wearing people. Those were civilians, and protecting them was necessary in the spirit of the UNSC Resolution. I doubt if anybody would define the rocket-propelling, military-fatigue wearing revolutionaries that fill the media now as civilians. The fact that the revolutionaries have resorted to participate in the conflict have denied them of the honour of being referred to as ‘civilians’. It was evident that the bombings of Gaddafi artillery were to clear way for the revolutionaries to advance on Tripoli and other Gaddafi bases. However, the lack of war discipline and absence of a clear military strategy among them has only prolonged the conflict. 

The situation here is very close to that in Cote d’Ivoire. With support from the UNOCI and French forces, Ivorian rebel forces took over the entire country within eleven days. They swooped on the commercial capital, Abidjan from their base in the north, took control of key cities and dislodged ex-President Laurent Gbagbo from power. The pattern of the rebel movement showed that it was coordinated. The UN and French strikes on Gbagbo forces were to buy time and space for the rebels to take control. But in Libya, the rebels are uncoordinated, so the same result could not be achieved.

If international forces really want to protect civilians, then Misrata, where Gaddafi forces have continued to visit violence on unarmed civilians would have been the place to be. The map of the conflict however shows that international forces are scarcely engaged in this western rebel-held town.

A New Bay of Pigs?
The UNSC Resolution has made it clear that no foreign troops were to print the sole of their boot on Libyan soil. In other words, if Gaddafi must be defeated, he should be defeated by Libyans themselves. However, this reminds one of the Bay of Pigs. In this 1961 conflict, the United States had supported Cuban rebels, only to abandon them when it became clear that it would have to become physically involved. The Cuban rebels became cheap targets for Fidel Castro who rounded them up in no time. Rather than set the Cuban people free from what it termed as the ‘communist cancer’, the United States only dashed the hopes of freedom fighters and incurred the wrath of many Cubans. 

A little substitution is needed here. Replace Cuban rebels with Libyan revolutionaries, let the NATO forces et al represent the United States; consider the circumstances surrounding the two conflicts, then Cuba becomes Libya, and the battle for the soul of this country could easily go the way of the Bay of Pigs.

From recent events, it is becoming clear that the revolutionaries do not have what it takes to defeat Gaddafi. That implies that for any success to be achieved, NATO and its allies would have to send troops to the frontline, in contravention of the UNSCR 1973. Not doing that means that Libya would be lost totally, and more enemies would be made. Gaddafi who had made many concessions to atone for his 20th century sins would become emboldened that he could actually beat any opposition, and thus become more arrogant.

Recently, the United Kingdom and France have expressed their willingness to send ‘advisers’ to the rebels. The only interpretation of this is that these two countries would be coordinating the war while Libyan revolutionaries do the fighting. The logic is that it is better for a Libyan to kill another Libyan. At least, s/he was not killed by Americans.

The Arms Embargo Question
It is important to ask where the rebels get their arms and ammunition. In other Middle Eastern countries where there have been riots, protesters throw stones, even though they are increasingly shot at. How does it happen that Libyan rebels immediately have access to arms including rocket launchers to fight with?

Recently, the United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron said the British government would, if it deemed fit, supply the Libyan revolutionaries with arms. One would ask if this was still in the scope of the UNSCR 1973. He has the answers: "We do not rule out supplying lethal equipment, but we have not taken a decision to do so and there remain legal and practical questions which need to be carefully considered."

According to him, the UNSCR 1973 had called for ‘all necessary measures’, and the arms supply would help achieve the broad Libya objectives – that is, depose Gaddafi. What David Cameron seems to have forgotten is that the UNSCR 1973 had clearly forbidden the transfer of arms to either side of the conflict?

Could Gaddafi be right about the rebels?
As Col. Muammar Gaddafi struggled to retain the patronage of the world, he claimed that the revolutionaries were men linked with the dreaded al-Qaeda terrorist group. It would be wrong to use such a sweeping generalization for people who are united against a dictator. However, investigation by the London Telegraph has concluded that men arrested in connection with al Qaeda and who were detained by US authorities at the Guantanamo Bay military facility were among the rebel fighters and combat trainers. What if the al-Qaeda has stayed in the background in these conflicts, providing training and logistics? Wouldn’t helping the rebels eventually amount to helping the al-Qaeda?

Gaddafi had also claimed that the Western countries were interested in seizing Libyan oil. While that may be a claim made by a drowning man, it is possible that the Libyan conflict has provided opportunities for Western countries to test their new fighter jets. An American military-focused magazine has been discussing this issue recently.

Inconsistencies in World Response
In a rare first, The Gambia became the first African country to recognize the National Transitional Council of Libya. It froze the assets of the Libyan government in the country and gave diplomats of the Gaddafi government only 72 hours to leave the country. This was a historic first, and it pointed to the growing concern of the country’s leadership in international issues. 

However, as noted earlier, the world of global diplomacy is consistently inconsistent. While The Gambia opposed the manner in which President Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast came into power; it is sympathizing with the cause of the rebels in Libya. Trashed down to their barest, there is very little difference in the Cote d’Ivoire and Libyan cases – both rebel movements are being supported by Western countries.

For the United States, the speed with which it condemned Gaddafi for visiting violence on the protesters was lost in the cases of Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. Could there be double standards somewhere?

For its part, the United Kingdom has even reserved a seat for the ambassador of Syria to UK at the royal wedding of Prince Williams and Kate Middleton on Friday April 29. With the rate of violence the Syrian government has used on protesters, one would have thought that its ambassador to the UK would not be given such an honour denied former premiers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

Cracking the Nut
While military action worked considerably in Cote d’Ivoire to oust Gbagbo, it seems Gaddafi is immune to that. It is time that multiple strategies are brought on the table. The African Union which had bemoaned the spate of attacks on Libya has expressed its willingness to engage the Libyan sides in seeking diplomatic solution to the crisis. Nigeria has also said it would prefer a diplomatic resolution now. By bringing multiple options to the drawing board, Gaddafi might be encouraged to choose the one most suitable to him and leave power. If he were on the other hand faced with the military option, he would fight to the finish, and he would surely bring many men down with him.

Monday, April 11, 2011

From Grace to Grass: How Laurent Lost His Laurel


Is it possible for someone to reach the periphery of glory only to sink into the abyss of scorn? If your answer is no, consider the almost very rosy but sorry story of President Laurent Koudou Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire who got as close as becoming another shining example of leadership in Africa, only to fall out of grace, due to his impertinence and unwillingness to cede power to the democratically-elected president of Cote d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara.
Rising without any prior political structure, it was Laurent Gbagbo’s ideas and activism that endeared him to millions of Ivoirians. He stood in opposition to the regime of Ivoirian’s most beloved leader, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, and unsuccessfully contested election against Houphouët-Boigny himself. He won the confidence of the people and went ahead to win the presidential seat. Insecurity and fears of violence would not allow for the conduct of elections several times, Laurent Gbagbo who first became president in 2000 and whose term should have ended in 2005 was given the go-ahead to preside over the nation for another 5 years, until 2010 when elections were eventually held.
Laurent Gbagbo was carried away by the trappings of power that he did not step down when it became clear that he had lost the election. He has now led Cote d’Ivoire back into the civil war; old wounds have been reopened; enemies have been made; economy has been damaged; millions have been displaced; lives have been lost. Unfortunately for Gbagbo, he is one professor of history who failed to learn from history.

Biography
Born in the village of Mama, near Gagnoa in 1945, Gbagbo studied in Cote d’Ivoire and France, obtaining his doctorate at Paris Diderot University in 1979. He became a history professor and an opponent of the regime of President Félix Houphouet-Boigny. He was imprisoned from March 31, 1971 to January 1973.
In 1980, he became director of the Institute of History, Art, and African Archeology at the University of Abidjan. He participated in a 1982 teachers' strike as a member of the National Trade Union of Research and Higher Education, and at this time he formed what would become the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). He went into exile in France in 1982, only to return to Côte d'Ivoire on September 13, 1988 and at the FPI's constitutive congress, held on November 19–20, 1988, he was elected as the party's Secretary-General.

Politics
Laurent Gbagbo was elected into the National Assembly of Cote d’Ivoire at different times. He contested the presidency, against Robert Guie, the sitting president who had disqualified Henry Konan Bedie and Alassane Ouattara in October 2000. Guie claimed victory but it took street protests by Gbagbo supporters to install him as president. Guie fled, Gbagbo led.
A coup attempt in 2002 soon led into a civil war, and the mutineers, mostly soldiers of the northern extraction soon became the rebels, morphing many times to become the New Forces. Truce was signed, there was relative peace, but arms were still held. As a result of this, Gbagbo could still hold power for another five years. This was power not won, but bestowed on him by mediators – AU, UN, the French government – and approved by his countrymen.
But when the elections were contested and lost, Gbagbo failed to appreciate the benevolence of the Ivoirian people to allow him to led them at all. He stood adamant, directing his forces and militia to win the victory for him on the street just like they did against Robert Guie. This time, it was misplaced. He had won the 2000 election (by 59.4 percent), and so he had a claim to the throne. This time around, he had lost and has no claim to the throne.

History repeats itself
Many are the voices that support Gbagbo’s decision to stay put. We have seen the effects of his staying adamant to claim a crown he does not deserve. But the question we should be asking is this: What is possible if he had handed over power willingly to Alassane Ouattara?
The 2010 election cycle was not much different from the 2000 elections which Gbagbo won. The sitting president then Robert Guie was reluctant to leave power. Laurent Gbagbo had to call his million supporters into the street to force Guie to recognize him as president. One departure point however was that Guie did not impose a blockade on Gbagbo, as Gbagbo had done on Ouattara.
If he took over from Robert Guie this way, why can’t Ouattara take over from him in a similar way?

Had he ceded power…
We could only theorize on what the situation would have been if Gbagbo had not chosen the path he chose. The following were possible if Gbagbo had ceded power to Ouattara:
The animosities arising from the 2002-2004 civil war would have ended totally. One of the grouses of the northern rebels was that they were marginalized. A northerner (Ouattara) becoming a president would have healed those wounds.
There would not have been a return to arms. Security would have been maintained.
Many lives would not have been lost, nor would many people be displaced.
The economy would have been saved. 
There would not have been reasons for ‘interventionist forces’ – French army and the UNOCI – to shell their arms on the Ivoirian soil.
Gbagbo would have been acclaimed as a great leader, who had the interest of Cote d’Ivoire at heart. Successors, however much they disagree with their predecessors, always have initial words of praise for them.
Gbagbo would not be holed up in his residence now. He would still have been cheered in the streets.
He would not be negotiating asylum/exile in another country/OR CAPTURED LIKE A RAT.
He would not be afraid of being murdered.
He would still have had the chance to contest the polls again.
Maybe he would by now be a potential recipient of the Mo Ibrahim African Leadership Award.

However, Gbagbo did not step down while he had the chance; so, all the above are no longer possible. He has now been captured, and has against his will surrendered to Alassane Ouattara. Rather than enjoy a status as an elder statesman, Gbagbo will now face a court for his crimes. His credibility as a leader who seeks the broader interest of his nation and its people has been dented. He can no longer be praised for his great services for the Ivoirian nation.

And so, Laurent Gbagbo has lost his laurels.