Friends Again!

The recent diplomatic strain between The Gambia and Senegal should not surprise us. Many African countries have a long history of diplomatic spats, especially those countries that are contiguous like The Gambia and Senegal. In many cases, the disputes arise from boundary issues (Nigeria versus Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula, pre-2003; Ethiopia versus Eritrea; Kenya versus Uganda), rebel insurgency (The Gambia versus Senegal, Rwanda versus DR Congo, Chad versus Sudan) or even a contest of influence (Nigeria versus Libya, Nigeria versus South Africa).

In these cases, we have seen direct confrontation in the form of full blown wars between two African states (Ethiopia versus Eritrea) or even indirect confrontation in the form of a jostle for precedence, envoy recall etc. In some cases, the rift was resolved. In others, there continues a low-level conflict, no matter how many peace truce or communiqués are signed. In the case of the latter, the true feelings of governments about the other are usually veiled.

For instance, we had to wait for Wikileaks (and how many years that took us!) to know that Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni had always believed that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was plotting to shoot his aircraft down. Museveni almost concluded that he had suspected right when his aircraft carrying the Southern Sudan leader John Garang crashed. The Eritrean president, according to Wikileaks, was always suspicious of Ethiopia, that there was a plot to poison him or remove him from power.

Not always do we have countries talking back. But in the case of The Gambia-Senegal friction that just healed, Wikileaks would be a loser. The statements were broadcast nationally in not less than three languages. The video clips were made available on the video sharing website Youtube. More than Wikileaks could have gone, the diplomatic brouhaha (over Iran arms shipment) between these two culturally unified countries took several miles ahead.

Now that the conflict has healed, thanks to proactive engagement between the two governments to return to the pre-conflict days, this piece hopes to look at the latest diplomatic conflict within the prism of previous conflicts, and use this to make an inference on the viability or even possibility of a United States of Africa which all ‘pan-African’ African heads of states said they desire.

The Senegambia Confederation

The Senegambia Confederation came into existence on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between The Gambia and Senegal signed on 12 December 1981. The federation was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 when The Gambia refused to move closer toward union.

The Senegambia Confederation did not start with the 1981 treaty; it was a project of both the French and English colonialists. According to Edmun Richmond in his seminal “Senegambia and the Confederation: History, Expectations, and Disillusions”, the British successfully captured major French trading bases along the Senegal River area in 1758 and formed the first Senegambia – a crown colony. The unified region collapsed in 1779, when the French recaptured Saint Louis and burned the major British settlement in the Gambia region, leading to the end of the unified region in 1783.

After the Treaty of Versailles of 1783 shared the two countries between the French and the British, the colonialists made efforts again to unify the colonies around 1860-70. This was also not successful. They later settled for the current border. According to Richmond, “this left the future Senegal and The Gambia with a large problem: how to successfully maintain two separate countries in a region with shared yet diverse cultural values and an international border which wedges one country into the middle of the other.”

The independent states soon tried to weld themselves together once again, fired by Leopold Sedar Senghor’s absolute belief in Negritude and that integration was best for Africa. While the union came together through the 1981 treaty, it was largely supported by the ruling class and the social elite; it was not much embraced by the public. The schism and stereotypes of that time still exist today; the distrust of one another is still in the present.

Some authors have pinned the dissolution of the Confederation to the fact that President Abdou Diouf of Senegal no longer felt compelled to honour the argument that there should be rotational presidency between the two countries. However, the palpable differences in the two countries’ economic policies among many others are pointers to the fact that the confederation was already heading for the doldrums. While the leaders succeeded in committing the political will to the Confederation, they did little to ensure harmonization of policies; thus relationships strain and the two had to say their goodbyes.

According to Hughes and Lewis in their article, “Beyond Francophonie?: The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect,” one of the most salient of the problems of the union is its pragmatic vs. ideological foundation. Since the union was forged because of mutual security concerns, the Confederation’s momentum began to die once people at all levels of both Senegalese and Gambian government began to move back and move on.

The 1981 failed coup d’état in The Gambia also instilled concerns that the government was losing its own power and identity through Senegalese engulfment. More so, Senegalese president Abdou Diouf had unilaterally removed Senegalese troops from The Gambia once Senegal was threatened by Mauritania. The fact that it took Senegalese troops to restore democratic rule in the wake of the coup made it a lord over security in the union, a sign of The Gambia’s waning influence in the union.

“The main platform on which union had been forged marked the beginning of the end. The official end came on 23 August 1989, when President Diouf decided it was best that the Confederation be placed aside after fruitless talks about a customs union.”

Despite the short-lived union, the Senegambia Confederation was one of the longest-lived African unions of the period. Had it succeeded, it would not only have solved economic tensions between the neighboring countries, but also given new hope to the concept of Pan-Africanism. It is however unfortunate that this shining first experience into the now trumpeted United States of Africa had to be abandoned.

The Casamance Question

Like the situations in Sudan/Chad and Rwanda/DR Congo, the question of the insurgency in Casamance has been the strain in the neck of the two governments and it is often the wood that stokes up the fire in their relationships.

According to the statement read on the GRTS by the Secretary General to the government in the height of the conflict, Senegal had insinuated that The Gambia was supporting the rebel movement in Casamance. He went on to make an allusion to the fact that the President being a Jola, (the dominant tribe in the Casamance region) the Senegalese side believes the rebels get support from here. He has debunked this claim, and even outlined the number of steps that The Gambia government takes to defeat the insurgency.

It is my candid opinion that the two sides should more proactively find enduring solutions to the Casamance problem. No blames should be traded. As the last conflict showed, the single most visible dividing cord was the insurgency in Casamance. Yet, the relationship mending meeting recently held in Dakar does not provide solutions to the problem. The joint communiqué released at the end of the meeting of foreign ministers, Dr. Mamadou tangara of The Gambia and Maître Madické Niang of Senegal mentioned everything from trade strengthening, collaboration in health care delivery and other sundry issues. It however stops before it would address the Casamance issue. (See full communiqué below.)

Since the two countries are affected by the insurgency (Gambia arresting and prosecuting rebels who cross over to its territory; Senegal losing soldiers to the fight), it is necessary to jointly put an end to it. This would ensure an atmosphere where the two countries would enjoy their cooperation in other areas.

Be that as it may, it is worthy to note, albeit perfunctorily here, that the desire of movements to secede and form separate countries belies the ‘commitment’ of leaders to the united Africa dream. (Sudan is a case in point!) Leaders who want one African government should first hold their country together. If countries divide on basis of ethnicity or religion, what says that the US of Africa would ever work?

With skirmishes like this, is there any hope for the United States of Africa?

My answer is no. The call by some leaders for a US of Africa actually seems more like hypocrisy, or some catchy slogan the deep meaning of which they do not realize. Or why would someone call for a US of Africa, and still call for African countries to go ahead and divide on the basis of ethnicity or religion? That to me is hypocrisy.

Contiguous African states and regional groupings like ECOWAS, SADC, etc. need to make concerted efforts to ensure harmony among themselves. This would make it easier for the US of Africa to be realised.

It is also important to point out that absolute humility is needed on the part of African leaders. The moment we have a single government, they would cease to be presidents, at which time they would become governors. This would even constrain their abilities to rig elections or perpetuate themselves in power, since there would be a higher authority.

Conclusion

The decision of Gambian and Senegalese authorities to mend relationship following the December diplomatic conflict is commendable. However, efforts should go beyond the almost familiar lines of strengthening diplomatic relationships without pinning it down to the real issues that in the first place cause the conflicts.

It has always been said that in diplomacy, no friends are permanent, neither are there permanent foes. Thus, when there are strains in diplomatic relationships, it is important to address the issues as they are, as this would help healing.

Communiqué

At the invitation of His Excellency Maître Madické Niang, Senior Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal, Honourable Dr Mamadou Tangara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad of the Republic of The Gambia undertook a working visit to the Republic of Senegal, on Tuesday 4th January 2011. The purpose of the visit was geared towards strengthening the existing co-operation and friendly relations between the two countries.
During his visit, Honourable Dr Mamadou Tangara was also received in audience by His Excellency Maître Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal, to convey a special message from His Excellency Sheikh Professor Dr Alhaji Yahya AJJ Jammeh, President of the Republic of The Gambia. Honourable Minister Tangara also met with His Excellency Maître Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, Prime Minister of the Republic of Senegal, during which the latter made a proposal to host the next Joint Consultative Committee meeting not later than the end of February 2011.
The two Foreign Ministers had a tête-à-tête discussion during which they reviewed the following issues:

· The status of implementation of the outcome of the 5th Session of the Ministerial Joint Commission Meeting between Senegal and The Gambia.

· The terms and conditions of the Consultative Committee meeting to be co-chaired by Their Excellencies Madam Dr Aja Isatou Njie-Saidy, Vice President of the Republic of The Gambia and Maitre Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye, Prime Minister of the Republic of Senegal.

· The process for the establishment of the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat.

· With respect to the conclusions of the 5th Session of the Joint Ministerial Co-Commission, the two Ministers noted, with satisfaction, the efforts made by the two Governments to facilitate the stay of the nationals living on either sides of the two countries borders.

· They also welcomed the significant progress achieved with regard to the conclusions of the meeting of the Joint Boundary Committee, held in Banjul on May 10, 2010, as well as the initiatives developed at the border area concerning the access to medical care.

· In addition, the two Ministers pledged to pursue efforts aimed at accelerating the implementation of the recommendations of the 5th Session of the Joint Ministerial Commission, especially those relating to: the establishment of a network of Senegalese and Gambian women entrepreneurs; and experience sharing in the areas of hydrocarbons, domestic fuel and renewable energies.

· The two sides also decided to cooperate and work on initiating joint projects in all areas, especially: In the area of Health – to promote experience sharing in the form of twinning, particularly in the health districts located in border areas; Electrification of cross-border areas by power companies and rural electrification agencies of both countries, based on existing funding opportunities at ECOWAS; and Education - with respect to the Consultative Commission, the two Ministers reiterated their commitment to making this institution a forum for dialogue and consultation to monitor, in the interest of both countries, issues related to their economic and social development.

· In this regard, they promised to make every effort to meet by the end of February 2011, as proposed by His Excellency the Prime Minister of Senegal. They also reaffirmed their willingness to continually work together to strengthen the existing fruitful cooperation and friendly relations between the two countries, particularly through the establishment, by the end of February 2011, of the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat. In this regard, both Ministers mentioned the principle of a rotating chairmanship after a period of three years, renewable once.

NB: Most of these communiqué points were also covered in the communiqué issued at the end of a visit by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade to The Gambia in January 2010.

Harry Belafonte & Nat King Cole

Cote d'Ivoire: ECOWAS’ big diplomatic headache

The events in Cote d’Ivoire should be of worry to us. Laurent Gbagbo has refused to relinquish power to Alassane Outtara, who was declared duly elected president in the November 28, 2010 presidential elections by the country’s Electoral Commission. The result was certified by the UN Mission in the country which had the mandate to certify results in its umpire role. However, in a twist of events, the Constitutional Council, headed by a Gbagbo ally declared thousands of votes from the north, apparently a stronghold of Ouattara as invalid, thus securing a ‘win’ for Gbagbo. The calculation was not that simple, as this act of the Constitutional Council has taken the country back many miles. Now, the old wounds that caused the 2002 Civil War seem so fresh, and they are hurting. Claiming onto his mandate, Ouattara swore himself in and formed a cabinet. Gbagbo had done the same. One plus one is not always two. To a lay watcher, Gbagbo was basking on his power of incumbency, with both the state broadcaster and the military machine backing him. However, the funds of the government remain in the hands of the Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), and being an arm of the Economic Community of West African States which recognized Ouattara, it declined Gbagbo access to the funds he would need to function effectively as president. This may seem like some soap opera, but it is not. The situation in Cote d’Ivoire is a time bomb. First, it discredits the political process in Africa. Despite some mild gains in democratic governance, the recent wave of sit-tightism which has brought in its wake the concept of power sharing is doing harm more than good. What Gbagbo fails to realize is that he would have been a far more honourable man leaving the reins of power. He could start the campaign that Ouattara is not Ivorian enough or that he is a puppet of foreign power, he could however not dispute the fact that the election was decided against him. There are many challenges that confront us in this case, and this piece intends to look at each of these and the possible consequences.

First, why would Gbagbo not leave?
A flashback into events that prelude the elections might help. More than once, Ouattara had been denied an opportunity to run for presidential elections. Being from the north, it was suspected that his parents are of Burkinabe origin, and that he was in fact born in Burkina Faso. (However, the ‘birthers’ have not provided a shred of evidence to support this.) His place of birth has been recorded as Dimbokro in central Cote d'Ivoire, but others put it at an unidentified place Burkina Faso. He had his primary and secondary education in Burkina Faso, but that does not make him a Burkinabe. How many Senegalese children are students in The Gambia? Does that make them Gambian? No. In 1995, it was decided that people who have not lived inside Cote d’Ivoire for at least five years and/or whose one of the parents is of foreign nationality is not Ivorian enough, and so could not contest presidency. Having worked for the most part of his life outside Cote d’Ivoire, Ouattara was disqualified. The same thing happened in 2000. In an interview with L’Humanite magazine on August 26, 2007, President Gbagbo said Ouattara could not contest. Whereas when asked in an interview about Ouattara's nationality, Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré responded, "For us things are simple: he does not come from Burkina Faso, neither by birth, marriage, or naturalization. This man has been Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire." Gbagbo continued to follow through his Ivoirite (Ivorianess) policy. Many people in the north claimed that they were denied of their nationality as Ivoirians. They could not get Ivoirian identity cards. In 2002, some northern soldiers mutinied, thus leading the country effectively into civil war. The election was thus necessary to wound old scars. Under this arrangement, there was no another choice but to allow Ouattara to contest. At this point, Gbagbo started to campaign under the slogan "we win or we win". It was evident that he was not prepared for an exit. Assuming office in 2000, Gbagbo's original mandate as president expired on October 30, 2005, but due to the lack of disarmament following the Civil War, it was deemed impossible to hold an election, and therefore his term in office has been extended since.

Could Ouattara have won?
The north of Ivory Coast sees itself as marginalized. The repeated attempts to block Ouattara from contesting the polls have only helped to solidify his northern stronghold, where many people now believe that a Ouattara win is a win for them all, and a redress of history. This would be seen in a massive turnout of voters during the voter registration process and the elections. It is nearly impossible for Gbagbo to have won votes from the north, but Ouattara could still have won votes from the south, which is Gbagbo’s stronghold. It is reflective to note that Ouattara had struck a deal with Henri Konan Bedie, another presidential aspirant, to support him as the frontrunner for the opposition in the second round. The excuse that rebels rigged in favour of Ouattara could then be lame on delivery. The vote was largely a statement from the collective north that it was time one of their own rules. Ouattara win could also signify the yearning of pro-Houphouet-Boigny democrats, which now formed the bulk of opposition, to return to power. What does the situation portend for Ivory Coast and what are ways of working this diplomatic jigsaw? The United Nations, African Union, European Union and ECOWAS have all recognized Ouattara as the duly elected president. This has narrowed choices for Gbagbo who now faces a number of sanctions, mostly economic sanctions and travel bans. The BCEAO has also refused him access to Ivorian funds. There are already proposals for dialogue and mediation in the matter. There is a proposed ECOWAS military intervention, and there is a more consuming economic sanction.

Dialogue and Mediation The path which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union are presently toeing is the dialogue/mediation process. As the chairman of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan said, the regional bloc would do anything legitimate to restore democratic principles in Cote d’Ivoire. Include in this bracket the use of force if that is the only way Gbagbo could be removed. But before that, all soft measures would be sought. Already, three ECOWAS leaders (Yayi Boni of Benin, Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and Pedro Pires of Cape Verde) have met with both Gbagbo and Ouattara. While Gbagbo has signified an intention to seek a ‘peaceful’ end to the crisis, he has shown no signs of relinquishing power. By even mooting a possible recount of the votes, it is said that Gbagbo is posturing himself for a power-sharing deal in the manner of Kenya and Zimbabwe, though he was not categorical about this. The problem with such power sharing deals is that it does not resolve the problem; it only postponed it. Experiences in both Kenya and Zimbabwe have shown that rather than heal the wounds, both the president and the newly created premiership are strange bedfellows. Their cohabitation in the power deal does not obliterate the existing animosity nor does it help the country move forward. By agreeing to a peace talk without pre-conditions, Gbagbo seem to call Ouattara to let go of his claim to presidency. The only solution that dialogue/mediation can bring is to give the mandate back to the rightful owner. Anything short of that is just a postponement of woes.

ECOWAS military intervention
ECOWAS has not ruled out a military intervention to oust Gbagbo. But this is fraught with more problems than could be imagined at first. This would be the first time that ECOWAS would be using force to settle a political quagmire within a country. But then, not all West African countries subscribe to this interventionist force. The Gambia, for its part, has shown its disavowal of any military plans to oust Gbagbo. While The Gambian government discredits this option, asking ECOWAS why it had not intervened in similar crises in Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau, and why its intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia came after thousands of lives have been lost, it is important to point out that there is always a first time. This might be that first time. But what are the permutations for an ECOWAS force at this time? Nigeria, which is by far the biggest of the ECOWAS states, and the seemingly most advanced in military operations, could not at this time commit troops to a cause that is remote, while there are bomb explosions rocking the country by the day. The security challenges of other ECOWAS countries are enough to stop them from committing troops to such an operation. [Senegal is fighting an insurgency in Casamance; both Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry are just stabilizing]. As one commentator pointed out, the years 2011 and 2012 are political years for many ECOWAS countries, and ‘bringing back body bags does not help campaigns’. So, if ECOWAS would truly deploy a force, that would take some time when the security and political challenges before these countries could have subsided. Maybe Gbagbo would have served out the term by then. Another consideration here is that the Ivorian army stands solidly behind Gbagbo for now. This is a well-trained and tested army that could resist aggression. In other words, there would be many casualties, more than is necessary to oust a single person. As a matter of fact, the ECOWAS military intervention is more of an empty threat than a meant line of action. Yet Alassane Ouattara and his comrades still believe that ECOWAS could still send in a troop. Guillamme Soro, Ouattara’s prime minister has said that the only power that could force Gbagbo out is a military intervention. Ouattara himself said: "All that needs to be done, as has been done in other African countries, is to come and get Gbagbo and remove him from the presidential palace." This is easier for Ouattara to say because he has never been in the military. No commandant ever wants his troops dead. And they cannot just ‘remove him from the presidential palace’ when he still has a corps of loyal officers.

Exile or Amnesty
In his first interview with the press since he was holed up in the Hotel du Golf, Alassane Ouattara has said that Gbagbo would have his full rights as a citizen if he relinquishes power. That is amnesty. However, if he chose to leave the country, Nigeria and the United States have indicated interest to welcome him and make him feel at home as much as he wants. There is no indication Gbagbo would settle for this option, unless economic sanctions incapacitated him from paying salaries and carrying out the functions of his office effectively.

Could there be a relapse into the civil war?
Not necessarily. Presidential claimant, Alassane Ouattara played down any possibility of the country returning to its 2002-2003 civil war hostilities. According to him, a neatly done removal [by ECOWAS forces] need not ignite violence. According to the BBC, even during the civil war, there were never large-scale hostilities, rather the odd skirmish and riots in cities such as Abidjan, the commercial capital and a stronghold of Mr Gbagbo, which saw attacks on foreigners, Muslims and northerners. Ouattara has however accused Gbagbo of buying time to recruit mercenaries to kill the Ivorian people. It was documented that during the civil war, Liberian mercenaries helped Mr. Gbagbo’s troops, and are still helping him. This time around, Liberia is ready to denounce any Liberian who fight for any of the parties in Cote d’Ivoire. But as the seat of power is in the south, the northern rebels would not want to be shut away again. They would rather not fight.

Conclusion
The situation so far presents questions, and rarely offers answers. How would ECOWAS resolve this crisis, if at the end of dialogue and mediation, Gbagbo refuses to step down, and Ouattara does not rescind his claim to the presidency? Would BCEAO offer Gbagbo access to the country’s funds again, as many innocent civil servants especially would be affected? Or would the military who support Gbagbo now enter the fray, declare themselves winners of this deadlock? It is yet to be seen how the crisis could be contained. However, if ECOWAS could provide an effective solution to this, then bravo to democracy in the subcontinent.