Cracking the Libyan Jigsaw

Col. Muammar Gaddafi has been a difficult nut to crack. Despite efforts of the international forces to curtail his forces from using violence on the Libyan people, he has continued to defeat the revolutionaries. Even the latest shelling of his Bab al Aziziah compound is not enough to deter the Libyan strongman. Now in its 10th week, the protests against Gaddafi has still been unable to unseat him while though the noose has tightened around his neck, Gaddafi is showing no signs of leaving.

Events have taken many different turns and twists in the last 10 weeks, and while Gaddafi was morally battered for his forces’ response to the Arab-wide protests in his territory in the wake of the protests, current happenings and the interpretations we might adduce from them show that Gaddafi may now have a ‘moral’ edge over his adversaries, especially the international forces that have stepped up actions against his regime.

This article is not an attempt to support Col. Gaddafi. It however aims at balancing views in light of other similar historical events.

If it is true, as some claim, that the field of international relations and global diplomacy is a murky water, consistently inconsistent, then the Libya situation and the response it has elicited so far has proven it so. When the United Nations determined that civilians were no longer safe at the hands of the Gaddafi force, that the rights of ‘peaceful’ protesters to demonstrate their anger at their government was being impeded, that the freedom of speech was being restricted, it adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 

The resolution came on 17 March 2011, a full one month since the troubles erupted. The UNSCR 1973 is a broad policy direction aimed at pressuring Gaddafi to leave. It includes chiefly instituting a ‘no-fly’ zone, economic sanctions and travel restrictions on key Gaddafi henchmen, arms embargo and protecting civilian populations. Let us take each of these one after the other.

The UNSCR 1973 authorized member states who have expressed willingness to participate in the assault on Libya to do so, after getting the clearance such from the UN Secretary General. It also approved ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. The problem with the resolution was that it did not define what it means when it says ‘civilians’ or what measures it categorises as being ‘necessary’ to deter Gadaffi from his murderous stance. I concur that the meanings of these words might be self-evident at the start of the conflict, but they don’t seem to remain so any longer.

For instance, the first images that emerged of the Libyan protesters were of placard-carrying, mufti-wearing people. Those were civilians, and protecting them was necessary in the spirit of the UNSC Resolution. I doubt if anybody would define the rocket-propelling, military-fatigue wearing revolutionaries that fill the media now as civilians. The fact that the revolutionaries have resorted to participate in the conflict have denied them of the honour of being referred to as ‘civilians’. It was evident that the bombings of Gaddafi artillery were to clear way for the revolutionaries to advance on Tripoli and other Gaddafi bases. However, the lack of war discipline and absence of a clear military strategy among them has only prolonged the conflict. 

The situation here is very close to that in Cote d’Ivoire. With support from the UNOCI and French forces, Ivorian rebel forces took over the entire country within eleven days. They swooped on the commercial capital, Abidjan from their base in the north, took control of key cities and dislodged ex-President Laurent Gbagbo from power. The pattern of the rebel movement showed that it was coordinated. The UN and French strikes on Gbagbo forces were to buy time and space for the rebels to take control. But in Libya, the rebels are uncoordinated, so the same result could not be achieved.

If international forces really want to protect civilians, then Misrata, where Gaddafi forces have continued to visit violence on unarmed civilians would have been the place to be. The map of the conflict however shows that international forces are scarcely engaged in this western rebel-held town.

A New Bay of Pigs?

The UNSC Resolution has made it clear that no foreign troops were to print the sole of their boot on Libyan soil. In other words, if Gaddafi must be defeated, he should be defeated by Libyans themselves. However, this reminds one of the Bay of Pigs. In this 1961 conflict, the United States had supported Cuban rebels, only to abandon them when it became clear that it would have to become physically involved. The Cuban rebels became cheap targets for Fidel Castro who rounded them up in no time. Rather than set the Cuban people free from what it termed as the ‘communist cancer’, the United States only dashed the hopes of freedom fighters and incurred the wrath of many Cubans. 

A little substitution is needed here. Replace Cuban rebels with Libyan revolutionaries, let the NATO forces et al represent the United States; consider the circumstances surrounding the two conflicts, then Cuba becomes Libya, and the battle for the soul of this country could easily go the way of the Bay of Pigs.

From recent events, it is becoming clear that the revolutionaries do not have what it takes to defeat Gaddafi. That implies that for any success to be achieved, NATO and its allies would have to send troops to the frontline, in contravention of the UNSCR 1973. Not doing that means that Libya would be lost totally, and more enemies would be made. Gaddafi who had made many concessions to atone for his 20th century sins would become emboldened that he could actually beat any opposition, and thus become more arrogant.

Recently, the United Kingdom and France have expressed their willingness to send ‘advisers’ to the rebels. The only interpretation of this is that these two countries would be coordinating the war while Libyan revolutionaries do the fighting. The logic is that it is better for a Libyan to kill another Libyan. At least, s/he was not killed by Americans.

The Arms Embargo Question

It is important to ask where the rebels get their arms and ammunition. In other Middle Eastern countries where there have been riots, protesters throw stones, even though they are increasingly shot at. How does it happen that Libyan rebels immediately have access to arms including rocket launchers to fight with?

Recently, the United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron said the British government would, if it deemed fit, supply the Libyan revolutionaries with arms. One would ask if this was still in the scope of the UNSCR 1973. He has the answers: "We do not rule out supplying lethal equipment, but we have not taken a decision to do so and there remain legal and practical questions which need to be carefully considered."

According to him, the UNSCR 1973 had called for ‘all necessary measures’, and the arms supply would help achieve the broad Libya objectives – that is, depose Gaddafi. What David Cameron seems to have forgotten is that the UNSCR 1973 had clearly forbidden the transfer of arms to either side of the conflict?

Could Gaddafi be right about the rebels?

As Col. Muammar Gaddafi struggled to retain the patronage of the world, he claimed that the revolutionaries were men linked with the dreaded al-Qaeda terrorist group. It would be wrong to use such a sweeping generalization for people who are united against a dictator. However, investigation by the London Telegraph has concluded that men arrested in connection with al Qaeda and who were detained by US authorities at the Guantanamo Bay military facility were among the rebel fighters and combat trainers. What if the al-Qaeda has stayed in the background in these conflicts, providing training and logistics? Wouldn’t helping the rebels eventually amount to helping the al-Qaeda?

Gaddafi had also claimed that the Western countries were interested in seizing Libyan oil. While that may be a claim made by a drowning man, it is possible that the Libyan conflict has provided opportunities for Western countries to test their new fighter jets. An American military-focused magazine has been discussing this issue recently.

Inconsistencies in World Response

In a rare first, The Gambia became the first African country to recognize the National Transitional Council of Libya. It froze the assets of the Libyan government in the country and gave diplomats of the Gaddafi government only 72 hours to leave the country. This was a historic first, and it pointed to the growing concern of the country’s leadership in international issues. 

However, as noted earlier, the world of global diplomacy is consistently inconsistent. While The Gambia opposed the manner in which President Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast came into power; it is sympathizing with the cause of the rebels in Libya. Trashed down to their barest, there is very little difference in the Cote d’Ivoire and Libyan cases – both rebel movements are being supported by Western countries.

For the United States, the speed with which it condemned Gaddafi for visiting violence on the protesters was lost in the cases of Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. Could there be double standards somewhere?

For its part, the United Kingdom has even reserved a seat for the ambassador of Syria to UK at the royal wedding of Prince Williams and Kate Middleton on Friday April 29. With the rate of violence the Syrian government has used on protesters, one would have thought that its ambassador to the UK would not be given such an honour denied former premiers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.

Cracking the Nut

While military action worked considerably in Cote d’Ivoire to oust Gbagbo, it seems Gaddafi is immune to that. It is time that multiple strategies are brought on the table. The African Union which had bemoaned the spate of attacks on Libya has expressed its willingness to engage the Libyan sides in seeking diplomatic solution to the crisis. Nigeria has also said it would prefer a diplomatic resolution now. By bringing multiple options to the drawing board, Gaddafi might be encouraged to choose the one most suitable to him and leave power. If he were on the other hand faced with the military option, he would fight to the finish, and he would surely bring many men down with him.

From Grace to Grass: How Laurent Lost His Laurel

Is it possible for someone to reach the periphery of glory only to sink into the abyss of scorn? If your answer is no, consider the almost very rosy but sorry story of President Laurent Koudou Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire who got as close as becoming another shining example of leadership in Africa, only to fall out of grace, due to his impertinence and unwillingness to cede power to the democratically-elected president of Cote d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara.

Rising without any prior political structure, it was Laurent Gbagbo’s ideas and activism that endeared him to millions of Ivoirians. He stood in opposition to the regime of Ivoirian’s most beloved leader, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, and unsuccessfully contested election against Houphouët-Boigny himself. He won the confidence of the people and went ahead to win the presidential seat. Insecurity and fears of violence would not allow for the conduct of elections several times, Laurent Gbagbo who first became president in 2000 and whose term should have ended in 2005 was given the go-ahead to preside over the nation for another 5 years, until 2010 when elections were eventually held.

Laurent Gbagbo was carried away by the trappings of power that he did not step down when it became clear that he had lost the election. He has now led Cote d’Ivoire back into the civil war; old wounds have been reopened; enemies have been made; economy has been damaged; millions have been displaced; lives have been lost. Unfortunately for Gbagbo, he is one professor of history who failed to learn from history.

Biography

Born in the village of Mama, near Gagnoa in 1945, Gbagbo studied in Cote d’Ivoire and France, obtaining his doctorate at Paris Diderot University in 1979. He became a history professor and an opponent of the regime of President Félix Houphouet-Boigny. He was imprisoned from March 31, 1971 to January 1973.

In 1980, he became director of the Institute of History, Art, and African Archeology at the University of Abidjan. He participated in a 1982 teachers' strike as a member of the National Trade Union of Research and Higher Education, and at this time he formed what would become the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). He went into exile in France in 1982, only to return to Côte d'Ivoire on September 13, 1988 and at the FPI's constitutive congress, held on November 19–20, 1988, he was elected as the party's Secretary-General.

Politics

Laurent Gbagbo was elected into the National Assembly of Cote d’Ivoire at different times. He contested the presidency, against Robert Guie, the sitting president who had disqualified Henry Konan Bedie and Alassane Ouattara in October 2000. Guie claimed victory but it took street protests by Gbagbo supporters to install him as president. Guie fled, Gbagbo led.

A coup attempt in 2002 soon led into a civil war, and the mutineers, mostly soldiers of the northern extraction soon became the rebels, morphing many times to become the New Forces. Truce was signed, there was relative peace, but arms were still held. As a result of this, Gbagbo could still hold power for another five years. This was power not won, but bestowed on him by mediators – AU, UN, the French government – and approved by his countrymen.

But when the elections were contested and lost, Gbagbo failed to appreciate the benevolence of the Ivoirian people to allow him to led them at all. He stood adamant, directing his forces and militia to win the victory for him on the street just like they did against Robert Guie. This time, it was misplaced. He had won the 2000 election (by 59.4 percent), and so he had a claim to the throne. This time around, he had lost and has no claim to the throne.

History repeats itself

Many are the voices that support Gbagbo’s decision to stay put. We have seen the effects of his staying adamant to claim a crown he does not deserve. But the question we should be asking is this: What is possible if he had handed over power willingly to Alassane Ouattara?

The 2010 election cycle was not much different from the 2000 elections which Gbagbo won. The sitting president then Robert Guie was reluctant to leave power. Laurent Gbagbo had to call his million supporters into the street to force Guie to recognize him as president. One departure point however was that Guie did not impose a blockade on Gbagbo, as Gbagbo had done on Ouattara.

If he took over from Robert Guie this way, why can’t Ouattara take over from him in a similar way?

Had he ceded power…

We could only theorize on what the situation would have been if Gbagbo had not chosen the path he chose. The following were possible if Gbagbo had ceded power to Ouattara:

• The animosities arising from the 2002-2004 civil war would have ended totally. One of the grouses of the northern rebels was that they were marginalized. A northerner (Ouattara) becoming a president would have healed those wounds.

• There would not have been a return to arms. Security would have been maintained.

• Many lives would not have been lost, nor would many people be displaced.

• The economy would have been saved. 

• There would not have been reasons for ‘interventionist forces’ – French army and the UNOCI – to shell their arms on the Ivoirian soil.

• Gbagbo would have been acclaimed as a great leader, who had the interest of Cote d’Ivoire at heart. Successors, however much they disagree with their predecessors, always have initial words of praise for them.

• Gbagbo would not be holed up in his residence now. He would still have been cheered in the streets.

• He would not be negotiating asylum/exile in another country/OR CAPTURED LIKE A RAT.

• He would not be afraid of being murdered.

• He would still have had the chance to contest the polls again.

• Maybe he would by now be a potential recipient of the Mo Ibrahim African Leadership Award.

However, Gbagbo did not step down while he had the chance; so, all the above are no longer possible. He has now been captured, and has against his will surrendered to Alassane Ouattara. Rather than enjoy a status as an elder statesman, Gbagbo will now face a court for his crimes. His credibility as a leader who seeks the broader interest of his nation and its people has been dented. He can no longer be praised for his great services for the Ivoirian nation.

And so, Laurent Gbagbo has lost his laurels.

The Responsibility to Protect and State Sovereignty: The Case Against Libya

"People in front of tanks were crushed. The unity of China was more important than those people on Tiananmen Square. When Tiananmen Square happened, tanks were sent in to deal with them. It's not a joke. I will do whatever it takes to make sure part of the country isn't taken away." – Muammar Gaddafi

Events in Libya have raised more than one question of the validity of foreign interference – in the name of global diplomacy – in issues deemed to be internal affairs of Libya. It is not only in Libya that these important questions have raised their heads, but in all countries where there seems to be conflict of one sort or the other, especially where it is government versus a group of people. It would be good to quickly point out that The Gambia’s aversion to the ECOWAS/AU/UN stance on the election standoff in Cote d’Ivoire is because of what it termed ‘undue interference in the internal affairs of Cote d’Ivoire’ and consequently an affront to the sovereignty of Cote d’Ivoire.

There could be arguments for and against global intervention in ‘internal conflicts’. This piece endeavours to ‘defend’ the actions taken by the international community on Libya.

The United Nations is the world’s foremost global diplomacy body. Coming out of the beleaguered League of Nations in 1945, the goal of the UN is to ensure a world safe enough for everybody to live in. The League of Nations before it had failed because it could not prevent the Second World War, therefore the first objective of the UN is to ensure global peace. This would imply that the UN is imbued with the authority to prevent wars and conflicts, or where there are, fast-track the process of peace. Thus, it does not matter whether these conflicts are inter- or intra-states. The mere presence of conflict is enough reason for the UN to wave its flag. In what manner it should wave it is the question.

Many nations of the world have signed to become recognized by the UN, and many have ratified its treaties, conventions, articles and Charter. By appending their recognition to these documents and treaties, countries express their agreement of the UN principles. There are two interpretation of this recognition: member states (1) approve the spirit and context of the document which they sign; and (2) they signify their intention to be bound by the provisions and conditions set out in the document. By so doing, they cede some of their rights to the United Nations. In situations where the countries run afoul of these UN principles, the UN does have a right to weigh in to enforce its rule. Thus, it could invoke its ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RToP) doctrine.

There are legitimate questions about when it could invoke this rule in crises situations. Freedom-Kai Phillips, a policy analyst and a representative to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) asked these important questions: “At what point in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe does a sovereign State lose its right to manage its own internal affairs without outside interference? What threshold must be reached before the international community has the legal right to intervene when massive human rights violations are being committed in a country?”

‘The responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) doctrine has longstanding roots in customary law, but was first formally introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and subsequently clarified in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit outcome document. RtoP is an ever-evolving and innovative international legal concept aimed at preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

When does it become clear for instance that the Gaddafi government could no longer resort to peaceful measures to deal with the rebel movement? When the protests broke out, Gaddafi had promised that the rebel movement would be defeated. Nobody had problems with that. But he soon went to call the protesters all sorts of names and made a new stronger vow to root out the protesters, and kill them to the last man. This probably was the point that the international community started to listen and watch events in Libya more. Images soon emerge when unarmed protesters were fired at. [I have seen these videos of which I write.]

Maybe one of Gaddafi’s greatest undoing was his choice of words. I find this shocking: "People in front of tanks were crushed. The unity of China was more important than those people on Tiananmen Square. When Tiananmen Square happened, tanks were sent in to deal with them. It's not a joke. I will do whatever it takes to make sure part of the country isn't taken away."

At this point, it became clear that rather than follow the path of other countries in the Middle East who have immediately committed themselves to reforms, Gaddafi wanted to maintain the status quo. As infamous as the massacre of Chinese students were in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Gaddafi found these words to express what he would do.

This and many other statements, and acts of aggression emboldened the resolve of the United Nations to act. For the UN, the time was absolutely ripe to invoke the RToP doctrine.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon submitted a report outlining a three-pillared approach to implementing RtoP. First, sovereignty must be viewed in light of responsibility, in that States have a reciprocal obligation to protect their citizens. Second, the international community must be prepared to provide development assistance and capacity building for States, as RtoP cannot be conceptualised in a geo-political vacuum, but rather as a culmination of socio-political circumstances which must be holistically and sustainably addressed. Finally, in the face of a manifest failure by a State to protect its citizens, the international community must be prepared to provide a timely and decisive response.

In the case of Libya, it seems clear that the State had failed to protect its citizens; it had declared war on them, and thus it was important that the global world respond.

There have been precedents that necessitate this needed action. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 shows the failure of the international to act fast against an humanitarian crisis. Events in Libya clearly pointed out another crisis that could lead to genocide. The world needs not to wait for this.

Selective Intervention?

One could argue that the international community has been selective in its enforcement of the RToP. Why have governments’ repressions against protesters in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain being overlooked for instance? According to the United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, each case has its own merits and should be taken as a stand-alone.

It is true that extensive Western interests in these countries would make hard-standing difficult. But then, governments in these countries have changed hands. The Bahraini leader, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa inherited the position from his father in 1999, while the Saudi Arabia King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz came on the throne in 2005. True it is that these are monarchies, but true it is also that powers have changed hands. This is not the same with Libya, where Gaddafi has directed affairs since 1969. Libya thus presents its own unique case. Reports of human rights abuses in the past, repression of the freedom of expression and many others further present Libya as a unique case.

Despite the escalation of conflicts, one could only hope that the Gaddafi regime bows to the aspirations of the people: to cede power. With that, the unity of the country would still be preserved and more bloodshed could be averted.

Ode to an Emperor

Having led a privileged life as Brother Leader and guide of the Libyan ‘Revolution’ for 41 years now, Col. Muammar Gaddafi is an alien to living as an ordinary man again, and that is why he finds calls that he should step down as Libya’s leader as an anathema. Even though what was supposed to be Libya’s version of the Jasmine Revolution has now morphed into a civil war which is increasingly claiming lives, destroying properties and crippling the future, Gaddafi has shown no signs of stepping down and has even vowed to fight till the last breath.

Events in recent days show the Emperor regaining control of Libya, confident once again that he might win this war. As his son, Saif al-Islam puts it: “Everything will be over in 48 hours.”

Since the beginning of the Libyan revolution, some people, I included, have been making extra efforts to understand how the Gaddafi mind works, his philosophy of governance issues of state security and negotiating peace. For this special task, I have made extra efforts, often at personal discomfort to finish reading Gaddafi’s treatise on governance, The Green Book. The first time I endeavored to read the book was in 1999, but it took a revolution in the desert country a decade and two years after for me to finish it up.

Gaddafi was clear enough in his philosophy: Democracy is sham and it robs people of their powers.

He was baffled how one person for instance could represent a constituency of thousands. That is injustice. For him, pluralistic governance composed of people’s congresses and committees is the key to the prosperity of the nation. He described his system as Islamic/Arab socialism, where people themselves should be the executor of power.

My understanding of this is that it is Gaddafi who had betrayed his treatise, by instituting an inner circle of committee loyal to him alone and not to the country, to be the executor of people’s will. By neutralising an atmosphere by which people could line up behind another leader, Gaddafi has instituted a monolithic structure that pays tribute to himself alone, effectively neutering opposition.

Maybe Gaddafi needs a lesson from his own book. The Libyan revolution, the one that is happening now, is just what Gaddafi had idealized. According to him, the people should have a direct say in the affairs of the government, not through layers and layers of committees and congresses that mean only one thing: Gaddafi.

The people have formed their own committees, not committees formed on their behalf and are now demanding their own agenda. They were demanding that Gaddafi has had enough shot at the No. 1 spot. It was an agenda drawn up by the people themselves, not by external actors, as Gaddafi wants us believe. If this revolution had been to fight, let’s say the Americans, I believe Gaddafi himself would edge the people on.

As Western diplomats have written (thanks to Wikileaks!), no one really understands the Gaddafi mind, or what the next script in his playbook could be. However, if we take some liberty to examine his past conducts and speeches, it portrays a person torn between the divisions in himself, thus, portraying to the world two-sidedness that could only point to larger inner contradictions.

In a fiery broadcast in the early days of this revolution, Gaddafi had said he has no position to stand down from, that he would fight till the last ounce of his breath. Gaddafi said the people fighting for their freedom are not revolutionaries; they are al-Qaeda frontmen who have been supplied with ammunition and are high on drugs.

Would the Emperor define for us what a revolution could have meant? Gaddafi had once sought to rewrite history by labelling his coup d’etat as a revolution. In all major revolutions of the world, an institution has grown out of the popular disaffection people have for previous rulers. They are aware of the misgivings of the previous regimes, and rather than entrench themselves, they build institutions. This is not the case in Libya, where everything has revolved around Gaddafi.

Gaddafi told us that he has no position to stand down from. Is that true? If he has no position in the Libyan hierarchy, why is he the face of that country at international fora? His argument could have been tenable if the General Secretary of the Libyan People’s Congress for instance had been the Libyan head of state who represent the country at the Africa Union level, or if he (GS) had been the one who addressed diplomats at the 2009 United Nations General Assembly. For all we know, Gaddafi was not representing anybody at these fora. He represented himself as the leader of Libya. That exactly is the position the protesters want him step down from.

Gaddafi is many persons to many people. Some have commended him for his call for a United States of Africa? I have commended him for his spirited effort at bringing Africa closer to a more effective union. But one has reasons to second-guess his motives. Was Gaddafi ever serious with this call, seeking sincerely the goodwill of Africa, or he was just looking for a grander platform to rub his ego.

It is instructive to note that when African countries were not moving towards union fast enough, Gaddafi ghost-organised a meeting of African kings who then go ahead to crown him as the King of Kings of Africa. He also declared himself as the Imam of Imams at an Arab League meeting, walking out of a meeting of Arabs heads of states, in antagonism to the Saudi King Abdullah.

Anybody who sincerely wants the unity of Africa and its prosperity would not call for its disintegration. Rather, he would seek ways by which unity could be made lucrative. However, Gaddafi failed this test, as he called for the split of Nigeria along religious lines when religious tensions heated up between Muslim and Christians in Jos. This pointed to another contradiction in the Libyan leader.

What could have been his motive to have betrayed his life-long dream of Africa unity. It is on record that Gaddafi’s personal commitment and push was instrumental in the transformation of the lame-duck Organization of African Unity into the Africa Union. However, his passion for incendiary remarks, what in Nigeria would be called diarrhoea of the mouth is rubbishing his great record of service.

Another contradiction in Moammar Gaddafi is quite recent. He wanted the world to believe that the revolutionaries are being edged on by al-Qaeda, but now that it seems the tide is flowing in his favour in the conflict, Gaddafi has threatened the West that he would liaise with al-Qaeda to fight the West. Something doesn’t ring right there. If al Qaeda has sponsored an insurgency against you, why would you it be the same al Qaeda that you work with again?

Though Gaddafi gradually looks as if he would survive the revolution, the Emperor’s authority has been challenged, and it is expected that for some time now, he would go back to his pariah status.

Issues from the conflict

It is marked that the West was reluctant to support the Libyan revolutionaries. Whatever the ‘real’ reasons, the fact that Tunisia and Egypt unplugged their long-term rulers without Western support could have encouraged the foot-dragging on whether to help the Libyans stop Gaddafi or not. But anybody would know that neither President Zine Abideen Ben Ali nor President Hosni Mubarak had the level of brutality to kill people wanting to free themselves of tyranny as Gaddafi had done. They should have known that Gaddafi could not have been an easy ruler to remove. An earlier action would have saved a lot of lives, and avoided this bust of activities we have seen in recent days.

If Gaddafi wins, which he may, the world should expect many more deaths. Gaddafi does not look if he would forgive the insurgents. We could just expect that large scale genocides might happen against his ‘enemies’.

Whatever the outcome which would become clearer in the coming days, the Emperor has shown us that there are more contradictions to him than we might thought before.

Headfirst into the Muddle!

I borrowed this title from Kola Tubosun’s 2003 collection of poetry Headfirst Into The Meddle to exemplify how African leaders, especially those from the south of the Sahara, have been shying away from discussing the crises in North Africa. No diplomatic moves have been made; no pronouncements; no policy statements. The response of many of Africa’s leaders to the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia to me is a way of burying their heads deep down in the muddle.

So far, the revolution spreading through the north of our continent has been labeled as a Middle East /Arab Revolution. There have been mirrors of the upsets in several other Arab countries: Yemen’s President Saleh has vowed not to seek for election any longer when he finishes with his term in 2013 (first elected in 1973); Jordan has replaced its prime minister; Algeria has signaled to repeal the emergency law in force for decades now; there have been minor unrests in Sudan. All these are countries with a majority of Arabs.

There is a pattern to the riots. They have been more profound in countries where the leaders have overstayed their welcome. In the countries mentioned above, the leaders have spent an average of 30 years (that’s a generation!) lording over the people, and refusing to be led! The people are bound to get tired of a one-man show at one time or another.

What happens to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa? The conditions in these places are sometimes not even as bad as what we have down here. Many of these ‘Arab’ countries have great infrastructures that we lack. As their leaders have been maximum rulers, so do we have our own. Egyptians are complaining of the 30 year rule of President Hosni Mubarak; what do we say of the rules of both Robert Mugabe and Paul Biya in Zimbabwe and Cameroon respectively. Both have presided over their countries for three decades now, just like Hosni Mubarak.

The fact that the crises in North Africa are as much our own crises has thus incapacitated the leaders of sub-Saharan African countries from making any comments on these crises. Would Robert Mugabe or Paul Biya for instance ask Hosni Mugabe to stand down and stop the repression of the people, knowing that they suffer from the same syndrome? No. Rather than have a definitive answer to the crises spreading in our northern hemisphere, our leaders have preferred to run underground, headfirst into the muddle!

The popular uprising in the Arab world is not the first time it would happen in Africa (and it will not be the last). In 1993, Nigerians, children and adults from all walks of life rejected the continuing rule of Gen. Babangida. Popular protests, strike actions etc. forced the general to step down, the same way Zine al-Abeedeen Ben Ali of Tunisia did, on the day he would mark his eighth year as Nigeria’s leader.

As it is presently, not many African leaders have the moral upstanding to rebuke Hosni Mubarak or to declare their support for the people as the United States of America has done. Compared to Egypt’s or Tunisia’s speck in the eye, we have a whole log in our eyes, and thus continue to shy away from the truth. And who are we to point out the speck in somebody’s eye when we have a log in ours?

I believe it is not because the social upheavals in much of the Arab world are none of our concerns that we have not had responses to them; it is because the leaders fear a threat to their grip on power and rule. However, the people are bound to see through this deception. Sooner or later, the people would realize that the leaders’ reluctance to issue statements on the crises in Egypt is not an excuse not to meddle in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, but to maintain their hold on power. When this deception is blown, then sub-Sahara Africa could get ready for its wave of uprising. Zimbabwean prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai has already hinted of the possibility of this in Zimbabwe.

The only way that such grand social upheaval could be averted is when leaders realize that there is time for everything, and one of the greatest services they could do for their country is to leave peacefully when their time is up.

Friends Again!

The recent diplomatic strain between The Gambia and Senegal should not surprise us. Many African countries have a long history of diplomatic spats, especially those countries that are contiguous like The Gambia and Senegal. In many cases, the disputes arise from boundary issues (Nigeria versus Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula, pre-2003; Ethiopia versus Eritrea; Kenya versus Uganda), rebel insurgency (The Gambia versus Senegal, Rwanda versus DR Congo, Chad versus Sudan) or even a contest of influence (Nigeria versus Libya, Nigeria versus South Africa).

In these cases, we have seen direct confrontation in the form of full blown wars between two African states (Ethiopia versus Eritrea) or even indirect confrontation in the form of a jostle for precedence, envoy recall etc. In some cases, the rift was resolved. In others, there continues a low-level conflict, no matter how many peace truce or communiqués are signed. In the case of the latter, the true feelings of governments about the other are usually veiled.

For instance, we had to wait for Wikileaks (and how many years that took us!) to know that Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni had always believed that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was plotting to shoot his aircraft down. Museveni almost concluded that he had suspected right when his aircraft carrying the Southern Sudan leader John Garang crashed. The Eritrean president, according to Wikileaks, was always suspicious of Ethiopia, that there was a plot to poison him or remove him from power.

Not always do we have countries talking back. But in the case of The Gambia-Senegal friction that just healed, Wikileaks would be a loser. The statements were broadcast nationally in not less than three languages. The video clips were made available on the video sharing website Youtube. More than Wikileaks could have gone, the diplomatic brouhaha (over Iran arms shipment) between these two culturally unified countries took several miles ahead.

Now that the conflict has healed, thanks to proactive engagement between the two governments to return to the pre-conflict days, this piece hopes to look at the latest diplomatic conflict within the prism of previous conflicts, and use this to make an inference on the viability or even possibility of a United States of Africa which all ‘pan-African’ African heads of states said they desire.

The Senegambia Confederation

The Senegambia Confederation came into existence on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between The Gambia and Senegal signed on 12 December 1981. The federation was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 when The Gambia refused to move closer toward union.

The Senegambia Confederation did not start with the 1981 treaty; it was a project of both the French and English colonialists. According to Edmun Richmond in his seminal “Senegambia and the Confederation: History, Expectations, and Disillusions”, the British successfully captured major French trading bases along the Senegal River area in 1758 and formed the first Senegambia – a crown colony. The unified region collapsed in 1779, when the French recaptured Saint Louis and burned the major British settlement in the Gambia region, leading to the end of the unified region in 1783.

After the Treaty of Versailles of 1783 shared the two countries between the French and the British, the colonialists made efforts again to unify the colonies around 1860-70. This was also not successful. They later settled for the current border. According to Richmond, “this left the future Senegal and The Gambia with a large problem: how to successfully maintain two separate countries in a region with shared yet diverse cultural values and an international border which wedges one country into the middle of the other.”

The independent states soon tried to weld themselves together once again, fired by Leopold Sedar Senghor’s absolute belief in Negritude and that integration was best for Africa. While the union came together through the 1981 treaty, it was largely supported by the ruling class and the social elite; it was not much embraced by the public. The schism and stereotypes of that time still exist today; the distrust of one another is still in the present.

Some authors have pinned the dissolution of the Confederation to the fact that President Abdou Diouf of Senegal no longer felt compelled to honour the argument that there should be rotational presidency between the two countries. However, the palpable differences in the two countries’ economic policies among many others are pointers to the fact that the confederation was already heading for the doldrums. While the leaders succeeded in committing the political will to the Confederation, they did little to ensure harmonization of policies; thus relationships strain and the two had to say their goodbyes.

According to Hughes and Lewis in their article, “Beyond Francophonie?: The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect,” one of the most salient of the problems of the union is its pragmatic vs. ideological foundation. Since the union was forged because of mutual security concerns, the Confederation’s momentum began to die once people at all levels of both Senegalese and Gambian government began to move back and move on.

The 1981 failed coup d’état in The Gambia also instilled concerns that the government was losing its own power and identity through Senegalese engulfment. More so, Senegalese president Abdou Diouf had unilaterally removed Senegalese troops from The Gambia once Senegal was threatened by Mauritania. The fact that it took Senegalese troops to restore democratic rule in the wake of the coup made it a lord over security in the union, a sign of The Gambia’s waning influence in the union.

“The main platform on which union had been forged marked the beginning of the end. The official end came on 23 August 1989, when President Diouf decided it was best that the Confederation be placed aside after fruitless talks about a customs union.”

Despite the short-lived union, the Senegambia Confederation was one of the longest-lived African unions of the period. Had it succeeded, it would not only have solved economic tensions between the neighboring countries, but also given new hope to the concept of Pan-Africanism. It is however unfortunate that this shining first experience into the now trumpeted United States of Africa had to be abandoned.

The Casamance Question

Like the situations in Sudan/Chad and Rwanda/DR Congo, the question of the insurgency in Casamance has been the strain in the neck of the two governments and it is often the wood that stokes up the fire in their relationships.

According to the statement read on the GRTS by the Secretary General to the government in the height of the conflict, Senegal had insinuated that The Gambia was supporting the rebel movement in Casamance. He went on to make an allusion to the fact that the President being a Jola, (the dominant tribe in the Casamance region) the Senegalese side believes the rebels get support from here. He has debunked this claim, and even outlined the number of steps that The Gambia government takes to defeat the insurgency.

It is my candid opinion that the two sides should more proactively find enduring solutions to the Casamance problem. No blames should be traded. As the last conflict showed, the single most visible dividing cord was the insurgency in Casamance. Yet, the relationship mending meeting recently held in Dakar does not provide solutions to the problem. The joint communiqué released at the end of the meeting of foreign ministers, Dr. Mamadou tangara of The Gambia and Maître Madické Niang of Senegal mentioned everything from trade strengthening, collaboration in health care delivery and other sundry issues. It however stops before it would address the Casamance issue. (See full communiqué below.)

Since the two countries are affected by the insurgency (Gambia arresting and prosecuting rebels who cross over to its territory; Senegal losing soldiers to the fight), it is necessary to jointly put an end to it. This would ensure an atmosphere where the two countries would enjoy their cooperation in other areas.

Be that as it may, it is worthy to note, albeit perfunctorily here, that the desire of movements to secede and form separate countries belies the ‘commitment’ of leaders to the united Africa dream. (Sudan is a case in point!) Leaders who want one African government should first hold their country together. If countries divide on basis of ethnicity or religion, what says that the US of Africa would ever work?

With skirmishes like this, is there any hope for the United States of Africa?

My answer is no. The call by some leaders for a US of Africa actually seems more like hypocrisy, or some catchy slogan the deep meaning of which they do not realize. Or why would someone call for a US of Africa, and still call for African countries to go ahead and divide on the basis of ethnicity or religion? That to me is hypocrisy.

Contiguous African states and regional groupings like ECOWAS, SADC, etc. need to make concerted efforts to ensure harmony among themselves. This would make it easier for the US of Africa to be realised.

It is also important to point out that absolute humility is needed on the part of African leaders. The moment we have a single government, they would cease to be presidents, at which time they would become governors. This would even constrain their abilities to rig elections or perpetuate themselves in power, since there would be a higher authority.

Conclusion

The decision of Gambian and Senegalese authorities to mend relationship following the December diplomatic conflict is commendable. However, efforts should go beyond the almost familiar lines of strengthening diplomatic relationships without pinning it down to the real issues that in the first place cause the conflicts.

It has always been said that in diplomacy, no friends are permanent, neither are there permanent foes. Thus, when there are strains in diplomatic relationships, it is important to address the issues as they are, as this would help healing.

Communiqué

At the invitation of His Excellency Maître Madické Niang, Senior Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal, Honourable Dr Mamadou Tangara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad of the Republic of The Gambia undertook a working visit to the Republic of Senegal, on Tuesday 4th January 2011. The purpose of the visit was geared towards strengthening the existing co-operation and friendly relations between the two countries.
During his visit, Honourable Dr Mamadou Tangara was also received in audience by His Excellency Maître Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal, to convey a special message from His Excellency Sheikh Professor Dr Alhaji Yahya AJJ Jammeh, President of the Republic of The Gambia. Honourable Minister Tangara also met with His Excellency Maître Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, Prime Minister of the Republic of Senegal, during which the latter made a proposal to host the next Joint Consultative Committee meeting not later than the end of February 2011.
The two Foreign Ministers had a tête-à-tête discussion during which they reviewed the following issues:

· The status of implementation of the outcome of the 5th Session of the Ministerial Joint Commission Meeting between Senegal and The Gambia.

· The terms and conditions of the Consultative Committee meeting to be co-chaired by Their Excellencies Madam Dr Aja Isatou Njie-Saidy, Vice President of the Republic of The Gambia and Maitre Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye, Prime Minister of the Republic of Senegal.

· The process for the establishment of the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat.

· With respect to the conclusions of the 5th Session of the Joint Ministerial Co-Commission, the two Ministers noted, with satisfaction, the efforts made by the two Governments to facilitate the stay of the nationals living on either sides of the two countries borders.

· They also welcomed the significant progress achieved with regard to the conclusions of the meeting of the Joint Boundary Committee, held in Banjul on May 10, 2010, as well as the initiatives developed at the border area concerning the access to medical care.

· In addition, the two Ministers pledged to pursue efforts aimed at accelerating the implementation of the recommendations of the 5th Session of the Joint Ministerial Commission, especially those relating to: the establishment of a network of Senegalese and Gambian women entrepreneurs; and experience sharing in the areas of hydrocarbons, domestic fuel and renewable energies.

· The two sides also decided to cooperate and work on initiating joint projects in all areas, especially: In the area of Health – to promote experience sharing in the form of twinning, particularly in the health districts located in border areas; Electrification of cross-border areas by power companies and rural electrification agencies of both countries, based on existing funding opportunities at ECOWAS; and Education - with respect to the Consultative Commission, the two Ministers reiterated their commitment to making this institution a forum for dialogue and consultation to monitor, in the interest of both countries, issues related to their economic and social development.

· In this regard, they promised to make every effort to meet by the end of February 2011, as proposed by His Excellency the Prime Minister of Senegal. They also reaffirmed their willingness to continually work together to strengthen the existing fruitful cooperation and friendly relations between the two countries, particularly through the establishment, by the end of February 2011, of the Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat. In this regard, both Ministers mentioned the principle of a rotating chairmanship after a period of three years, renewable once.

NB: Most of these communiqué points were also covered in the communiqué issued at the end of a visit by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade to The Gambia in January 2010.